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"I thank my fortune for it.
My ventures are not in one bottom trusted.
Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate
Upon the fortune of this present year."
Merchant of Venice
Act I, Scene I
"put not your trust in money, but put your money in trust."
Oliver Wendell Holmes

PRSFACE
When I was a studmt in law school, I became interested in
the business organization known as a Massachusetts Trust. The
name in itself proclaimed it to be the product of the legal
minds of Massachusetts, but the text books failed to mention it,
and the law dictionaries ignored the Massachusetts trust altogether.
Other courses intervened, and the subject was added to that dis-
couraging long list kept by every law student which bears the
caption, "To Be Read Later."
During a summer course at Boston University a whole chapter
in our text, "Financial Organization and Management," 1 was
devoted to a business organization kno^m as a Massachusetts Trust.
The laws governing the more usual forms of organization, the
single proprietorship, the partnership, and the corporation, were
familiar; all built upon common law and statutory regulations,
based upon th^ individual right of contract, with subsequent right
of appeal to our courts of law for damages in case of breach.
These business organizations I had studied in law school, but the
Massachusetts Trust was familiar to me in name only. I eventually
learned that this type of organization bases its form not upon
statutory regulations, but upon the common law affecting trusts, a
branch of law within the confines of equity jurisprudence.
This has resulted in an organization with the advantages and
privileges of a corporation, but with the common law liabilities
T, Gerstenberg, C, V/. p. 56-71. "
"
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of a partnership. Because of this dual personality, the
Massachusetts Trust remained vap;ue and incomprehensible, until
the research necessary for this thesis, both historically and in
the field, brought forth the results found in th-^ following pages.
Much has b^en written about the management of trusts,
especially in the investment field, but v^ry little about the
advantages of the different types of organization. The laws
governing a partnership can be found in our Uniform partnership
1 p
Act, those governing the corporation, in our General Laws, ^
but the laws governing Massachusetts Trusts have not been
codified.
Looking back over the history of our codified laws, we note
the agitation which brought them forth. The question then arises
as to the duration of the common law trust without statutory
regulation. Realizing that law follows public opinion, but
follows very slowly, the legal profession may well ask what must
the layman know about the present status of these trusts before
demanding regulatory measures.
This thesis deals exclusively with this phase: the present
legal status of the so-called Massachusetts Trust. The informa-
tion contained herein h s been obtained from every available
source; from business men in the field who are regarded as
authorities by the legal profession, and from attorneys who are
known as consultants to trusts. Most of the material, however,
has been obtained from decisions rendared by our own Massachusetts
courts, and by the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 108
2. Ibid., Chapters 155, 156, 157, and 158.
ii

The author hesitates to present these findings upon a
subject that many of our best legal minds disclaim any know-
ledge of. ThH only justification is that the facts found in
the fol leaving pages t'-ive only an inkling; of the amount of
research I have covered in the past two years and the amount
of legal understanding resulting therefrom. I have, however,
a very thorough comprehension of the immense amount of
research still to be done in the years to come.
The author wishes to ih ank Professor Robert i5, Ireton,
co-author of the Federal Reserve Act, for the use of the
mater'' al he had collected on this subject, and for his
friendly advice and encouragement in preparing this thesis.
iii

INTRODUCTION
The year 1929 marked the end of the development stage in
the history of the American Investment Trust. In the United
States in June 1928, there were 185 companies of all types,
while in June 1931 there were 648 with an investment of well
over $3,000,000,000. ^ In Massachusetts alone during the
year ending November 30, 1931, 94 such voluntary associations
nad registered with the Department of Corporations and
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Taxation. These figures indicate a revival of interest among
business men in unincorporated associations, showing a decided
preference toward the Massachusetts trust.
The v/ord "trust" in connection v/ith a profit-sharing
association is a comparatively new use of the v/ord in the
investment field in this country, although investment trusts
have been familiar to European investors since 1865. In
3
Massachusetts these trusts were organized as corporations,
4 5
voluntary associations, or common law trusts. The legal
status of the corporation can be determined from our General
Laws, Chapter 156, and by the decisions of our Massachusetts
courts, for our judges have rendered decisions upon questions
involving the interpretation of almost every paragraph.
1. Keane's Manual of Investment Trusts p. XII of the preface
Figures not available for 1932.
2. Report of the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, p. 139
3. Examples: Lee, Higginson & Co., Stone Webster, & Blodget
4. Examples: Shawmut Association, The Commercial Investment Trust
5. Examples: Harris, Forbes fr Co., Old Colony Trust Co.,
Shawmut Bank Investment Trust
1

The laws governing a Massachusetts trust can not be found
in the statute books, as it is a coinmon law trust and part of
our heritage from Great Britain, These laws have not been
codified, yet the legal problems involved in this particular
form of organization is of especial interest to our Mass-
achusetts legislators, for able financiers prophesy that the
time is not far distant when state regulation will be
necessary to protect the funds of an ever-increasing number of
depositors.
The present law regulating these so-called Massachusetts
trusts is of two kinds: common law, when the court decides
that the organization is a common law trust; and statute law.
Uniform Partnership Act, when the court determines that the
organization is a partnership.
The rank and file of investors are not familiar with the
trust known to the legal profession as a Massachusetts trust.
In fact, the word, "trust," connotes such a diversity of
meaning that a brief discussion of its various uses is
necessary at this point.

ANALYSIS OF TRUSTS
Definition
. A trust is a legal relation existing tetween
two or more persons such that a court of equity will compel one
to hold property, or an interest in property, of v/hich he has
the legal title for the benefit of the other. The person so
holding this legal interest in property is ca_led the trustee,
and the person entitled to the benefit, or the equitable
interest in the property, is knovm as the beneficiary of the
trust, or the cestui que trust.
Webster's definition of a trust is a confidence reposed
in one person, called the trustee, for the benefit of another,
called the cestui que trust. A trustee is a person who takes
and holds th:- legal title to the trust property for the benefit
of another. The cestui que trust or beneficiary is the one who
has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of an estate,
the legal title to which is vested in another as trustee.
The definition most often quoted by the legal profession
is that of our own Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence, "A trust is a beneficial interest in,
or a beneficial ownership of, real or personal property,
distinct from the legal ownership thereof."^
All these definitions emphasize the idea of the legal
title in one person and the equitable title in another. In
1. Cochran, W, C. "Law Lexicon," p. 468
2. p. 81

order to understand the status of any type of trust, a clear
comprehension of the difference between the legal title and an
equitable title is necessary.
Meaning of Equitable Title. The term equity has two
meanings: one professional, the other popular. 'Nhen the
legal profession speaks of equity, it is thinking merely of
that part of the law of England which is derived, not from the
custom of the realm nor the enactment of parliam-nt, but from
the decisions of the old Court of Chancery. On the other hand,
when the nan in the street talks of equity, he is thinking of
ideal justice which is not regulated by the law and may be
even contrary to the law.
The principal concern of equity has been the protection of
property rights. As the common law recognizes none but the
legal title, he who seeks the aid of a law court must base his
demand upon his legal title. But when the legal title to an
estate is vested in one person, while the right to its use and
enjojmient is in another, an equitable interest is the result,
which, though ignored by the common law, can be preserved and
protected in equity. This is the basis of our trust lav/. The
trustee has the legal title which is recognized and enforced by
the common lav;; the cestui que trust, the equitable title. Any
abuse of trust is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court
of equity; hence the term, "equitable interest."

History of the Equity Court. This system of law known as
equitable jurisprudence had its beginning as a separate court
during the reign of H;dvmrd III, 131<i-1377. Sven at that time
the coimiion law was inflexible; precedents established by
decisions of nudges came to be considered binding upon succeed-
ing judges. These courts were not willing to provide a remedy
for evory wrong. If a precedent could not be found among those
formerly granted on facts similar to those of the case brought
by the plaintiff, he had no action. Therefore the King appointed
his Chancellor to hear such cases, and to render decisions
according to equity and good conscience. These decisions the
courts could not ignore, as it was the King's prerogative to
administer justice independently of the courts. The chancellor
and his assistant became known as the court of Chancery, Keeper
of the King's Conscience. As they were priests, not lav/yers, no
attention was paid to precedents; for "the king's bench is a
court of law, but the court of chancery is a court of conscience."
soon this Court of Chancery acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over cases when there were no forms of action by which relief
could be obtained at law. Ti*usts were the most conspicuous
example; for they are wholly without cognizance at common law,
and the abuses of such trusts are beyond the reach of legal
process. However, they are cognizable in courts of equity,
formerly courts of chancery, and an ample remedy is tnere given
in favor of the cestui que trustent for all vvrongs and injuries
whether arising from negligence or positive misconduct.
T"i Cochran, Y. C. '^e:.; Lexicon, p. 295

place in American Jurisprudence. T;his was the law of
England on July 4, 1776, and is of the utmost importance to
students of equity jurisprudence today, for our ov/n state
constitution following the English law states: "All the
laviTs which have heretofore been adopted, used, and ap. roved
in the Province, Colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay, and
usually practised on in the court of law, shall still remain
and be in full force, until altered or repealed by the
legislature;, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to
tlie right and liberties contained in the constitution.""^
One of the rules of the Supreme Court, made under the
authority of an act of Congress, is that, when not otherwise
directed, the practice in the high court of chancery in
2
England shall be follov/ed.
Our Federal Constitution provides that the judicial
power of the united States "shall extend to all cases in
law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be
3
made under their authority."
Therefore there can be no question regarding the
jurisdiction of the equity court over these so-ca lied
Massachusetts trusts, and it is to the decisions of these
courts that we must look to determine their legal status.
1. State of Massachusetts, chapter 6, article 6 of the
constitution.
2. Bein v. Heath, 12 Howard 168,- penn. v. Bridge Co.,
13 Hovmrd 518
3. Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Federal Constitution.

Kinds of Trusts. The word "trust" is used most commonly
in the following connections; trust companies, charitable
or public trusts, spendthrift trusts, monopolistic trusts, and
business trusts. The Massachusetts trust is an example of a
business trust. Space does not permit a legal analysis of each,
yet a brief survey of these various types, noting their
particular characteristics, is necessary in order to give the
Massachusetts trust its proper status in this trust structure.
Trust Coinpanies. These exist in the United States in
various forms. They are financial institutions, usually of
corporate form, organized to carry on a complete banking
service, with a savings department, and a trust department.
In their corporate capacity they act as trustee, managing
property under the law of trusts. This trusteeship for
estates, made by the terms of a will, and known as a
testamentary trust, is becoming very popular as persons
recognize the superiority of the fiduciary service rendered
by a corporate trustee with its fixed responsibilities and
its legal continuity. These companios are advertising the
advisability of a living or voluntary trust, a trusteeship
entered into during the life of an individual under a deed of
trust, thus releaving himself of the care of his estate.
Through a personal trust department, these trusts act as
guardians for minors and for incompetents, caring for securi-
ties, collecting incomes, and perfoming the usual routine
duties in this connection. A very special service is rendered
to municipal, county, state, and government officials by

acting as trustee and paying agent land-r bond issues. They may
be appointed fiscal agents for corporations to handle the
issuance of their bonds and the registration and transfer of
stocks.
The relationship which exists between these trustees and
their cestuis is a fiduciary one, governed by the equitable
law of trusts. They are not organized as common law trusts,
however, although all their trustee business is based upon the
common law. Their form of organization is a corporation, with
its attending rights and liabilities, and should not be con-
fused with the Massachusetts trust, a common law trust, the
subject of this thesis.
Charitable or public Trusts. This is a trust which is for
the benefit of an indefinite class of persons, sufficiently
designated to indicate the intentions of the donor. The court
of equity looks with favor upon gifts for charities, and will
endeavor to carry them into effect. Massachusetts is one of
the states where the statute of Charitable Uses is in full
force. The law of 15nglaiid upon the subject of gifts to
charitable uses as it was adiainistered by the Court of
Chancery became ijnerican law at the time of the adoption of
our constitution, and has continued to be the lav/ of this
state. It is interesting to note in this conoiection that the
famous Girard Will Case"^ concluded that the English Statute of
Charitable Uses of 1601 was but declaratory of the common law
1. Perry, j/.y^ "Trusts and Trustees," paragraph 737
2. 2 Howard 127
3. 43 Elizabeth C4

and that such trusts were valid in the absence of legislation,
and upon this has been based our own laws governing charitable
trusts. In Jackson v, Phillips, 14 Allen 539, our celebrated
charitable trust case, the principles set down during the reign
of Queen Elizabeth were reiterated, and the English system of
charitable trusts was formally adapted into our system of
jurisprudence.
Spendthrift Trusts. This type is a distinct American
institution. Its purpose is to provide for the beneficiary
against his own improvidence by providing against alienation
by anticipation of the trust income. The beneficiary cannot
assign his right to receive future income, nor can such income
be subjected to the payment of his debts. ''^ In England such
trusts hav3 been held invalid on the ground that it is
against public policy to permit the ownership of property
without permitting its alienation, nor burdening it with
2
liability for its oi-mer's debts.
In Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, the
court upheld the validity of the spendthrift trust. The
theory of the Massachusetts court is that the rule of public
policy which subjects one's property to the payment of his
debts does not subject the property of the donor to the debts
of his beneficiary, and does not give the creditors a right to
complain that in the exercise of his absolute right of dis-
cretion, the donor has not seen fit to give the property to
1. Eaton, W. F. "Eaton on Equity," p. 342
2. Younghusband v, Gisborne, 1 coll. 400, 63 Eng. Reprint 473
3. Hale v. Bowker, 215 Mass, 354

creditors, but has left it out of tVieir reach. The effect of
this decision is to legalize restrictions against the equitable
interests in personal property and to forbid such equitable
2
interests to be taken for the debt of the cestui.
The status of this type of trust is determined by the same
laws that govern the Massachusetts trust. The raode of its
creation is very different; sa spendthrift trust is either a
testamentary trust or a living trust, which will be executed
by the probate Court, where no questions arise as to its
identity. A Massachusetts trust is defined in its declaration
of trust, and that definition helps to determine its legal status.
Monopolistic Trusts. During the- 19th century, the Sherman
Anti-Trust laws made the word "trust" opprobrious to msjay. These
laws were aimed against organizations, usually corporations,
large and powerful enough to exercise monopolistic power over
output and prices in the particular industry with which they v;ere
connected. The history of these monopolies, especially the East
India Company and the Hudson Bay company, make interesting
reading for the student of history, and the law student will be
inte res-bed in the fact that our statutes have codified the
conmon law, and that an understanding of these statutes depends
upon an appreciable Icnowledge of the common law.*^
These are trusts, to be sure, business organizations, with
trustees and cestuis que trustent; but their status is determined
by their charter, as any other corporation. In this investigation
TT Hale v. Bowker, 215 Mass, 354
2, Dunn v. Dobson, 198 Mass. 142 j Hoffman v. N.3. Trust Co., 187
Mass. 205
3. Taft, W. H. "The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court," p. 20

it has been found that this type of organization is the popular
conception of the word "trust," but will concern us here only
as members of the trust family.
Business Trusts. The definition of a trust which challenged
me to make this investigation was made by Charles Gerstenberg:
"An investment company is a corporation (frequently a Massachusetts
trust) that seeks no control over the companies whose securities
it purchases. It undertakes no opera":ing or administrative duties
but contents itself with making profitable investments of the
1
moneys received from the sale of its securities."
L. R. Robinson in "Investment Trust Organization and
Management ' d fines an investment trust as "an agency by which
the combined funds of different participants are placed in
securities showing a distribution of risk such as to introduce
the 'law of average' in protection of the principal. Moreover,
in aiming solely at the safe and reasonable profitable employ-
ment of its subscribed investment funds, the investment trusts
definitely avoid any and all of those responsibilities of
control, management, finance, direction or special interest which
are sometimes tied in with investment." ^
These two definitions of a business trust are typical of those
found in books on financial organizations. They describe quite
definitely the purpose of these trusts, but give no hint as to their
status, and the legal questions involved in their organization.
The ambiguity of the various names is most confusing. A
corporation is always a corporation, but a business trust may be
1. Gerstenberg, C. W, "Financial Organization and Management,"
p. 587
2. Robinson, L. R. "Investment Trust Organization and Manage-
ment," p. 216

a "business association formed under a deed of trust, a voluntary
association, the common law trust, or a Massachusetts trust.
It has been found that a common law trust is knovm only in
this country. Trusts in Great Britain are organized as corpora-
tions, as are many here in Massachusetts, but the type that is
being investigated is the so-called Massachusetts trust, a
business trust based upon common It^w principles.
Common Law Trust. During a discussion on this subject with
a librarian in the Congressional Library in Washington, he made
this remark: "There is no organization known as a Massachusetts
trust. That is a name used by the legal profession to designate
a common law trust."
The next step in this analysis is to determine just what the
words "common law" mean when applied to a trust. The layman goes
to the dictionary for his definition.
Webster: "Customs which exists as law in evvry country
though it is known in Kngland as 'the coimnon law' or 'the custom
of the realm, ' the existence of which is nov/ usually proved by
showing that it has been affirmed by the courts, or at least has
been appealed to in the writings of great judicial sages."
The law student goes to Blackstone, known to every student
as the first professor of law. sir William Blackstone: "That
admirable system of maxims and unwritten customs, which is now
knoi'/n by the name of the common law, as extending its authority
universally over all the realm.""'"
1, Blackstone, w. 4 Commentaries 412

Mr. ChancQllor K©nt, who set himself the task of establishing
the common law in America vTote: "Unvrritten, or comiaon It^w in-
cludes those principles, usages, and rules of action, applicable
to the government and security of person and property, which do
not rest for their authority upon any express and positive
declaration of the ^^11 of the legislature
,
The research student finds that the term came into general
use in the reign of Edward I, when it was employed, first by
English lawyers to distinguish the general law of the land from
local customs, royal prerogatives, and in short from all that
was exceptional or s ecial. All expressly enacted laws were
excluded from the English lawyers' notion of the common law. It
was defined by Lord wensleydale in Mirehouse v. Mennel, 8 Bing.
515, as "a system which consisted in applying to new combinations
of circumstances those rules which vre derive from legal principles
and judicial precedents."
William Bracton who died in 1268 wrote the first systematic
treatise on the laws of England. English lawyers for a century
before Bracton' s time had been keeping minute records on pb.rch-
ment of all that the courts had don^, and from its rolls Bracton
cited numerous decisions. He cited them as precedents, paying
special heed to the judgments of two judges who were then dead,
Martin Pateshull and William Raleigh. Thus at a very early time
English "common law" showed a tendency to become what it afterwards
definitely did become, namely, "case law." The term "common law"
1. Kent, J. 1 Commentaries 470

was taken over from the canonists by English lawyers, .vho used it
to distinguish the general law of the land from local customs,
royal prerogratives, and in short from all that was exceptional or
special. Since statutes and ordinances were still rarities, all
expressly enacted laws were also excluded from the English lawyers'
notion of the common law."^
Sir Edward Coke, English barrister, Judge and reporter of the
first rank, was the greatest common lawyer of all time. His
knowledge of the law in days when it was most difficult to come by
astonishes common law students today. Coke held that the common
law wfc.s the very incarnation of hiiman v/isdom and that not only was
it superior to the king, in that the king had no prerogative but
that which the common law allowed him. Magna ^arta was regarded
as sijnply a declaration of the common law.
William Blackstone published his Commentaries in 1765. He
divided the civil law of England into lex scripta or statute law,
and lex no scripta or common law. The latter consists of (1)
general customs, which are the common law strictly so called, (2)
particular customs prevailing in certain districts, and (3) laws
used in particular courts. Common law is not set down in any
written statute or ordinance, but depends upon immemorial usage
for its support. The validity of these usages is to be determin-
ed by the judges. Their judgments are preserved as records, and
it is an established rule to abide by former precedents v/here
the same points come again in litigation. Although a statute can.
1. woodbine, G. iJ. "Bracton' s Note-Book," p. 38

of course, abolish any rule of coinmon law, it can only do so by
express words. In the absenc^^ of such a manifest intention the
common law remains and is the key to unlock the meaning of the
statute which will always be construed by the light of it.
The common lav/ has often been described as the natural inher-
itance or birthright of Englishmen, and is as much a national
possession as the English lemguage itself. The pilgrim Fathers
brought it with them to America, even as they brought the English
speech, with the result that the common Ikw constitutes the basis
2
of the jurisprudenca of the states in the union, save Louisiana.
Most important of the legal institutions v;hich these United States
owe to England is this coimnon 1 w stystem of expressing and develop-
ing law. The fundamental feature of this system is the general
judicial recognition that a decision of a court in one case has a
degree of binding force when later a case arises which presents
similar facts. The common 1 w is the law developed and expressed
by judicial decisions. Thus the common lav/ has flexibility which
the law of statutes and codas does not possess; for a common law
principle is nevar absolutely binding upon a court; the power that
makes can always modity it, if the strict application of the prior
rule to the instant case would in the opinion of the court produce
injustice.
In brief, this is our debt to the English cominon law, its
place in our system of jurisprudence, and the respect with which
it is held by English and American jurists of note. An inter-
pretation of the constitution necessitates a knowledge of the
1, Summarized from Blackstone's Commentaries.
2, Chilholm v, Georgia, 2 Dallas 419
'5. U, S. V. Smith, 5 Whewton 153

ooimnon law; as it is full of such terms as "treason, " "trial by-
jury, " "the obligation of contracts," ali of which imply as a
condition precedent to the constitution the pre-existence of
1
common law*
Mr, Justice Story, ono. of America's great common law advocates,
is responsible for the following: "When John Adams was Vice -President
of the united States, Blount's Conspiracy was before the Senate,
and this question as to the adoption of the common law was
discussed before that body. His opinion, as that of a great
lawyer (_as he certainly v/as), and as a great revolutionary
patriot was called for on evory side. He rose from his chair, and
emphatically declared to the whole senate thfct if he had ever
imagined that the common lav; had not by the Revolution become the
law of the United States \md:r its new government, he never would
have dravn his sword in the contest. So dear to him were the
privileges which that law recognized and enforced." ^
And it is these privileges th; t accrue to any common lav/
trust today. If the courts determine that the legal status of
an orgimization is that of a common law trust, then on questions
in dispute it will be governed not by the written laws of the
state, but by that body of "principles and maxims brought by our
ancestors from England, v/hich must be the rule and guide of
judicial decisions to supply the defects of a necessarily imperfect
3legislation."
1. Com. V. Leach, 1 Mass. 59 (See Appendix;
2. Story, j. "Common Law," " "
3. State V, Lafferty, 1 Ohio 364 "

17
It is inmiaterial what type of business this trust carries
on. This cannot be over-emphasized. The popular use in our
newspapers today of the words "investment trust" has led many
into the erroneous belief that a trust is usually in the
investment business. At the beginning of this investigation,
it was sought to determine the status of the Massachusetts
investment trust. This was as illogical as it would be to
attempt to determine the l^gal status of the Massachusetts
dry goods corporations. The legal status of any corporation,
regardless of the type of business it carries on, is
determined by the Articles of Corporation, and the adherence
or violation thereto by the incorporators. These articles are
not left to the will or desire of the incorporators, but are
set out vory minutoly in our General Laws."*"
No statute law requires any set form for a declaration of
trust. The trustees, the cestuis que trust and their attorney
draw up an instrument which they declare is to be construed as
a common law trust, "/hen some question of lav/ arises, the judge
may hold that it is not a trust at all, but a partnership. He is
not governed by any statute law, he goes to judicial records and
2precedents for his opinion.
The advice of a well-knovm investment trust lawyer was sought
and this question put to him: "How does one determine the exact
status of a common law trust?" His answer was, "By determining
the exact legal status of evvry other type of organization, and
noting the points of difference, det -rmining not only what a
1. Massachusetts General Laws, chapteis 155-158
2, Commonwealth v. York, 9 Mete. 93 ( see Appendix)

common law trust is, but also what it is not."
The next step in this thesis is to analyze briefly the legal
status of the typos of organizations known In Massachusetts, and
to compere them with our oubject, the so-called Massachusetts
trust.

COHIPARISON OF TRUSTS
With
OTHER TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
Individual Proprietorship. ^fjhen a person does nothing
about the legal form of organization, he is d emed by the law
to have chosen this form of individual proprietorship; where-
in the whole income, the exclusive right to control, and the
liability for all debts are centered in him, the sole
proprietor. This is the simpliest form as it re^-uires no act
of incorporation by the owner. H© is governed by the law of
contracts; his rights are easily determinable from the niimerous
court decisions touching every conceivable phase of the relation-
ship between the parties to a contract. This single proprietor
has one gr -=at advantage over tha owners of other types of
organization: for he can go into any state in the union and
carry on his business protected by the constitution of the
United States, and unhampered by state laws governing
partnerships or corporations."^
Our concern in this thesis is with the type of organization
which may do a trust business. The sole proprietor can not do
this, for ho cannot be both trustee and cestui. The power he
exercises may det rmine whether the organization is a pure common
lav/ trust or a partnership.
1. Article IV, s.jction 2.

20
The General Partnership. Mr. Chief Justice Story defined
a partnership as "a voluntary contract betwe n tvvo or more
competent persons to plaice their money, effects, labor, and
skill, or some or all of th^^m in lawful commerce' or business,
with the understanding that th^re shall ho a commission of the
profits thereof between them." '"
A very simple definition is that a general partnership is
composed of several persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit. Since it is formed by an agreement of the parties,
it does not derive its existence from any act of the state. Its
powers are broader, for it may do practically all that a private
individual can do. It is not a distinct legal entity, as is a
corporation.
A partnership is created by contract, either written or oral.
As this contract may be either express or implied, it necessarily
follows that the contract need not bo evidenced by a witten
statement. If several persons engage to carry on as co-o-^vners a
business for profit a general partnership results, even though
they neglect to set up in writing articles of co-partnership.
If there is a question as to what the agreement is, th t is a
question of fact for the jury; if a question as to the effect
of the agreement, that is a question of law for th^ court.
One peculiarity of the p;:rtnership relation is that each
partner is jointly rnd severally liable for il the debts of the
firm. Joint and several liability results from an obligation
assumed by several, not only is each liable for his ovm share,
but also each one is individua ly liable for the vvhole
liability. Persons jointly liable must all be sued together,
1. Story, J. "partnership," p. 37

a discharge of one discharges all, and if one dies the liability-
rests in the survivors. If persons are sevorally liable, each
for only part of the contract, they must be sued individually,
and a discharge to one does not discharge the others.
In Massachusetts ajiy person conducting a business under a
name other than his own, wheth r an individual or a firm, is
required to record the true names and addresses with the city
or to'.m clerk, unless the firm name contains the true surnames of
persons conducting the business. For example, Mr. S. A. Jewell
and Mr. A, C. Wilson are partners conducting a business under the
firm name of The Spring Garage, They must file their names and
addresses with the city clerk, since tho name of the firm does
not contain their true surnames.*^
A second characteristic of the partnership relation is that
the relationship must be created by contract; there must exist
the principle of delectus personarum, or the right of selection,
partnership is a relation of trust and confidence, therefore it
can exist only when the parties have voluntarily created this
partnership relation. Thus, if a partner assigns his interest
to another, or if a person buys the interest of a deceased
partner, the buyer in neither case becomes thereby a member of
the firm. The buyer acquires merely the right to insist upon
an accoiinting, and to take whatev;?r rights the selling partner
vvould havG upon a settlement of the firm affairs. The partner-
ship has been dissolved in the first instance by the mere
1. Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 110, sections 5 and 6

assignment, and in the s cond instance, "by the death of a partner.
The third pecularity of a partnership relation is that
each partner is a general agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business, and tho act of ev ry partner, for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partners- ip, binds the partnership. This is one of the out-
standing disadvantages of the partnership relationship. Each
is the chosen agent of the other. Therefore contracts made by
one partner cannot be repudiated by the other, no lattter how
unreasonable. Nor can a dissatisfied partner plead, as in
agency, that his partner exceeded his authority, for the second
party to the contract knows "that the acts of one partner are
the acts of the other," ^
Consequently, the partnership form of organization hus
these two outstanding disadvantages : (1) the xmlimited
liability of each partner for a 1 tho debts of the firm, and
(2) the unavoidable termination of the relationship by the
death, insanity or bankruptcy of the individual partners, or
by the bankruptcy of the partnership itself, war between the
nations of the several partners will also v^ork a dissolution.
In the opinion of the many firms organized today as
partnerships, the following advantages far outnumber the
disadvantages: (1) delectus personnae, or the choice of a
partner, (2) personal contact between partner and client,^
(3) Uniform Partnership Law, (4) freedom from state
1. Story, J. "Partnership," p. 36
2. Doctors, lawyers, and dentists are not allow d to form
corporations
.
3. Acts 1922, chapter 486, section 1.

interferenc
, (5) freedom from corporate taxation.
This partnership relahion is one of th: oldest forms of
business organization, probably as old as business itself. The
same fvmdamental principles that underlie this relationship to-
day c&n be found in this partnership agreement mad^ in the fifth
century b fore Christ:
"During the 42nd Year of Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon,
(604-561 n, '\) two notables were making the following solemn
declaration before a priest and a scribe in the presence of
seventeen -vitnesses : 'Srib-sin and Nur-Shamash formed a
partnership. They came to the temple of Shamash to draw up
the project. All silv-r, goods, and slaves, male and female,
belonging to th^m indoors or out of doors, were shared by both
together. They realized their project. Silver for silver,
even to interest, brother will not dispute v/ith brother.
It is necessary to obtain a clear comprehension of the
advantages and disadvantages of this particular form of
organization before comparing it with a common law trust.
All teo often hav3 our courts found a declaration of trust to
be a contract of partnership, the v:ry type of organization,
with these unavoidable liabilities, the trustees and their
beneficiaries had planned to avoid.
* ^' H. "Babylonian and Assyrian Laws," p. 288

Distinction between a Partnership and a Trust. The most
difficult legal problem in ascertaining the status of the trust
is to determine the line that divides the partnership from the
trust. It was the belief of those who favored the trust organ-
ization that their indenture eliminated the' objectionable
features of a partnership contract, and included the advantages
of a corporation. In many cases the Massachusetts courts have
found the so-called trusts to be partnerships with the un-
limited liability of each partner for the debts of the compajiy.
The use of the words "trusts" or "trustees" is not
conclusive that the agreement creates a common law trust,
neither is the intention of the parties the determining factor.
The relation which the trust deed creates is to be ascertained
from the acts of the trustees and cestuis, irrespective of any
assertion to the contrary. A trust has some features in
conunon with a contract, but one great difference between them
is that a contract can be enforced only by a party or one in a
position of a party to it, while a trust can be, and generally
is, enforced by one not a party to its creation. A partner-
ship is founded upon a contract between the partners, and the
Uniform Partnership Act has stated definitely what the result
will be, but the business trust instrument may have provisions
included for the elimination of the partnership characteristic,
personal liability of its owners, only to be informed by the
court that this statement has no effect, and its shareholders
are partners governed by the rules of tie Act.
The drawing of a trust deed, trust instrument, or indenture
is beset with many difficulties. It is conceded that this form
of agreement states that the property interest of the parties

is to be represented by transferable certificates held by the
persons beneficially interested, with the title to such property
vested in the trustees. Such a deed should also contain the
statement that the cestuis are at no time to be considered
partners, and that creditors are to look to the trust property
for the payment of debts.
There are no statute laws directing the requirements of
a declaration of trust. This is a personal matter of contract
between trustees and cestuis. In this respect this form of
organization resembles an ordinary partnership. The lawyer who
is to write a declaration is oblig-ed to make a thorough examina-
tion of the trust deeds found in litigated cases, and to deduce
therefrom the words and phrases of limitation that make a
declaration a trust deed and not a partnership contract. The
fact that the shi res representing oivnership are transferable
is not conclusive that the organization is a trust. In 1884,
Oliver Wendall Holmes, then sitting on the bench of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, declared in Phillips v. Blatchford,^
137 Mass. 510, that it was too late to contend that partner-
ships with transferable shares w^ere illegal in this Common-
wealth.
Judge Morton in Koadley v. Commissioners of Essex, 105
Mass. 519, revie-vved the decisions of previous cases in Mass-
achusetts, and for the first time defined a test for determin-
ing the status of these trust organizations. This test has
become known as the control test, and refers to the control
exercised by the shareholders in the management of the trust.
1. See brief of this case in Appendix

Article IV of this trust deed reads: "The general management
of the business in the future shall be vested in an executive
committee of not less than three or more than five shareholders,
to be chosen by the whole body of shareholders at a meeting
called by the trustee for the purpose, and to serve till others
should be chosen in their stead; and that a majority of the
committee should constitute a quorum, and decide in all matters
over which the committee had control."
Article VIII: "In the event of the death, resignation,
or disability of the present trustee, a new trustee shall be
chosen by the shareholders."
The court decided that these two articles placed the
control of the management in the hands of the cestuis, since
they had power to choose an executive committee in which they
vested the general management, and to elect a new trustee in
case of death, resignation, or disability of the present
incumbent. This authority made the cestuis the principals,
and the trustee, their agent, acting under their direction
and control.
There is no case in the Massachusetts reports that over-
rules this d cision in Hoadley v. Commissioners of Essex, 105
Mass. 519. It is followed in '.Vhitman v, porter, 107 Mass. 522;
Phillips V. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510 j Ricker v. American Loan
& Trust Company, 140 Mass. 346; and in Williams v. Boston,
208 Mass. 487. In each of these cases it was found that the
shareholders stood in the relation of co-proprietors. This
right to act as co-owners, or co-proprietors, or partners, is

evidenoed by the pow^r to control the operations of the enterpri
through their control of the trustees.
The measure of this control is difficult to determine.
Frost V, Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, is a case v/hich is frequently
quoted. The Buena Vista Fruit Company was a voluntary
association created under a declaration of trust. This deed
gave the shareholders pov/er to remove the trustees at any time,
power to alter, amend, or repeal the by-lav/s; and po-.ver to
terminate the trust itself. Mr. Chief Justice Rugg held that
these provisions demonstrate that this association is a
partnership and not a trust."'"
When this organization came into court again in Horgan v.
Morgan, 233 Mass. 381, the court cited Frost v. Thompson,
stating that the orgairizers voluntarily adopted the partnership
form of association, and their rights and obligations as
shareholders are those defined by the established rules
2
applicable to ordinary partnerships.
The student of business organizations may well question
whether these shareholders did volimtarily adopt the partner-
ship form of association. The author of the trust deed in-
serted the statement that these shareholders were not
partners, and were not to be held to the unlimited liability
of partners. But to no avail, for the courts regard the
actual control exercised by the shareholders over the
management, irrespective of any limitations in the trust deed.
In Dana v. Treasurer f Receiver General, 227 Mass. 562,
the court declared that the certificate holders were partners
1. See brief of this case in Appendix.

when the declaration of trust empov/ered them to elect four trustees
at each annual meeting to serve for three year terms, and by a two-
thirds vote to alter, amend, or terminate tl;e trust at any regular
or special meeting.
Judge DeCourcey in Priestley v. Treasurer, 230 Mass. 452,
held the Warren Chambers Trust to be a partnership because the
shareholders reserved to themselves the follov/ing; (1) they were
to be associated together, (2) they were to have a fixed annual
meeting, and special meetings upon written request, (3) they were
empowered to fill any vacancy existing in the number of trustees,
(4) they were to have the power to remove any or all of the
present trustees and put others in their places, (5) they were
to make certain provisions regarding the purchase and sale of
real estate, (6) and they were to decide the final disposition
of the corpus of the trust.
1
This decision was quoted in Neville v, Gifford, 242 Mass. 1,
there were only tv/o shareholders, who Y/ere also the trustees.
The trust agreement provided that the shareholders may hold
meetings, increase or diminish the number of trustees, remove
any trustees except the original two, fill vacancies in the
board, modify or alter the trust, and terminate the trust at any
time, prior to that limited for its duration. Since the property
was to be subject to the control of the certificate holders, the
trustees were the mejiaging agents and not the principals, and the
relation was that of a partnership, not a trust.
1. See brief of this case in Appendix
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The court in Howe v. Chmeilinski, id37 Mass. 532, quoted
2
from the decision in Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, stating
the law very clearly. Where persons associated themselves to-
gether to carry on business for their mutual profit, they are
none the less partners because their shares in the partnerslnip
are represented by certificates ivhich are transferable and trans-
mittable, and because as a matter of convenience, if not of
necessity in case of transferable and transmittable certificates,
the legal title to the partnership property is taken in the name
of a third person. J-he person in whose name the partnership
property stands in such a case is perhaps in a sense a trustee.
But speaking with accuracy he is an agent who for the principal's
convenience holds the legal title to the principal's property.
3
In Flint v, Codman, 247 Mass. 463, this control test was
stated in these words: "It is manifest from Article X of the trust
deed that the shareholders have the ultimate control of all affairs
of the trust. Since the trustees may be removed at sjiy meeting of
the shareholders; or the frame of the declaration of trust be
altered; or the entire transaction terminated, sjid its affairs
liquidated; the trustees are subject to the shareholders, and
any suit brought by shareholders v/ill be settled upon the
principles governing partnerships in this Comraonwealth.
"
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed this
4Massachusetts test in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144: "Under the
Massachusetts decisions these trust instriaments are held to create
either pure trusts or partnerships, according to the way in which
the trustees are to conduct the affairs committed to their charge.
1, 2, 3, and 4. See briefs of these cases in Appendix
t

If they are the principals, and are free from the control of the
certificate holders in the management of the property, a trust
is created; but if the certificate holders are associated to-
gether in the control of the property as principals, and the
trustees are merely their managing agents, a partnership
relation between the cartificate holders is created."
In Crocker v. Mai ley, 249 U. S. 223,'^ the Supreme Court
expressed the law in one sentence thus: "The cestuis are
admitted not to be partners in any sense, v>rhen they have no
joint action or interest and no control over the fund."
The distinction between the common law trust and the
partnership is based upon this Massachusetts rule of control
over the management of the affairs of the organization. The
legal status of this type of organization is determined by the
courts upon the control exercised, not upon the wording of the
trust deed, which in every case limits the liability of the
cestuis. These words of limitation are mere surplusage, if the
court finds that the cestuis have actually exercised the rights
of partners. This is unquestionably the law today, and should
be thoroughly understood by both the trustees and the cestuis.
Association. A common law trust is sometimes known as a
voluntary association or a business association.
General Lavvs of Massachusetts, Chapter 182, section 1
defines axi association as "a voluntary association under a
written instrvmient or declaration of trust, the beneficial
interest under yitI ich is divided into transferable certificates
1. see brief of this case in Appendix

of participation or shares," and in the sejne section gives exactly
the same definition for a trust, "the word 'trust' shall mean a
trust operfr^ting under a written instrument or declaration of trust,
the beneficial interest under whr'ch is divided into transferable
certificates of participation or shares, other than a trust
established for the sole purpose of exercising the voting rights
pertaining to corporate stock or oth^r securities in accordance
with the terms of a written instrument."
An association was defined by Mr. Justice SaJiford of the
United States Supreme Court in the opinion delivered in Hecht
V. Malley, 265 U. S, 144,''" as "a term used throughout the united
States to signify a body of persons united without a charter, but
upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for the
prosecution of some coimnon enterprise. W© think that the v/ord
'association' clearly includes 'Massachusetts trusts' such as
those herein involved, having quasi-corporate organizations under
which they are engaged in carrying on business enterprises."
A trust was called an association but was held not to be a
partnership in cotton States Petroleum Co., v. Button, 230 S, W.
743. The case came to the Supreme Court on a question of venue.
This was determinable upon whether the individual defendants
were jointly li&ble upon the obligation of the company herein
sued upon. The theory of appellee is that the association
constituted a partnership rendering all the partners liable upon
the obligation of the company. The declaration of trust read:
"The said trustees shall hold all of the funds and property, real
and personal (hereinafter called the trust fund; now or hereafter
1. See brief of this case in Appendix
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held by, or paid to, or transferred or conveyed to them, or their
successors, or trustees, hereunder in trust for the purpose with
the powers and subject to the limitation hereinafter declt.red for
the benefit of the cestuis que trustent and it is hereby expressly
declared that a trust and not a partnership is hereby created that
neither the trustees nor the cestuis que trustent, shall ev-r be
personally lic^ble hereunder as partners or otherwise but that for
all the debts the trustees shall be liable as such to the extent
of trust funds only."
The court stated that there was nothing upon the face of the
declaration to show that a partnership exists between the trustees
and the beneficiaries. It may be that extraneous evidence might
be adduced which would show a partnership relation and liability,
but there is nothing in this record bearing upon the question
except the declaration of trust, and this upon its face is in-
sufficient for that purpose.
In Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 548, the Supreme Court
quoted the Massachusetts decisions and held: "The Commercial
Investment Trust is of the class commonly knowi as 'Massachusetts
trust' or 'common law trusts.' The Massachusetts courts give
effect to agreements lik?? the one here described, recognize the
entity of associations organized thereunder, and hold both
trustees and shareholders exempt from personal liability."
Judge Morton reviewed the law in The Associated Trust,
222 F (2d) 1012. The issue before the court vms v/hether the
Associated Trust was an unincorporated association within the
1. See brief of this case in Appendix.

meaning of the United states Bankruptcy Lav/. The opinion is given
in full: "The character of the respondent is to be gathered from
the trust deed, under it, the trustee declared t; at he would take
and hold in trust money paid to him by other persons to the amoiuit
of One Million Dollars, for which he would issue transfi^rable
certificates having a face value of One Hundred Dollars, entitled
to interest, and to participate in surplus earnings, and also
entitled to borrow from the trust sixty per cent, of the fac^ value
of the certificate, and after five years to receive from the trust
in cash the face value of the certificates upon the surrender there-
of. The trustee is given very broad powers as to the management
of the property in which the trust funds are invested, with the right
to determine what part of the income shall be divided and vrh&t shall
be retained as surplus. He has no power to bind any of the certifi-
cate holders; and they have no power to interfere directly in the
management of the property, and no title to it. There seems to be
nothing in the organization differentiating it under the Mass-
achusetts decisions from what may be called an ordinary trust;
that is, the beneficiaries, cestuis, or certificate holders,
(whichever they may be called) have no interest in the trust
property and no right to joint action for control of it. They are
in sbustance lik : beneficiaries in a trust under a v/ill. There
is no organization having a distinct entity apart from the trustees.
But the declaration of trust also provides that if the trustee
resigns, the certificate holders may, at a meeting ca^-led for the
purpose, elect a new trustee, that vacancies in the trusteeship
may be filled by election by a majority vote of the certificate
holders at meetings duly called; that at such meetings a
•.
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a majority of the outstanding shares shall constitute a quorum,
and that each share shall he entitled to one vote which may be
cast by proxy; and that the certificate holders by a three-
quarters vote of the outstanding shares may terminate the trust;
increase the number of shares and amend the declaration of trust.
This absolute power of termination and amendment gives the certif-
icate holders, as it seems to me the ultimate control of the
business of the trust whenever they choose to take that pov/er
into their hands. They have not yet done so, but the character
of the organization is to be gauged rather by the pov/ers of the
certificate holders than by the extent to which those powers
have as yet been exercised. An unincorporated association
seems to me exactly to describe what the respondent is."
Association distinguished from Trust. This distinction was
explained in detail by Mr. Chief Justice Rugg in Bouchard v.
1
First People's Trust, E53 Mass. 351. This was the first time
the Massachusetts court was ever required to decide this point.
The First People's Trust was a business organization .formed
xmder a declaration of trust. The trustees were given broad
powers, and were the masters of the corpus of the trust. The
deed of trust stated that the cestuis que trust ivere not
partners or associates or in any other relation whatever be-
tween themselves v/ith respect to the trust property. The word
"association" always implies, as an essential element, that there
be some form of organizaMon resembling modes of procedure in-
herent in incorporated bodies. The shareholders xmder this
declaration are unassociated, while the trustees have no
personal or beneficial interest in the trust property. Therefore
1. See brief of this case in Appendix

the First people's Trust is a pure trust, and not a voluntary
association within the General Laws of Massachusetts.
The decision in the Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144,"^ has
caused much discussion. This case went to the Supreme Court on
a question of taxation. The court reviewed the distinction
between a Massachusetts trust and a partnership, quoting the
Massachusetts decisions. The trusts in question were
established by the oestuis as pure trusts, following the
Massachusetts rule, that there be no association among the
certificate holders and no power to bind the certificate
holders personally for the debts of the trust. Yet the Supreme
Court held these organizations were "associations" under the
federal taaing statute.
To quote from the decision: "The word 'association'
appears to be used in its ordinary meaning in the statute. It
has been defined as a term used throughout the United States
to signify a body of persons united without a charter, but
upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for the
prosecution of some common enterprise. This court believes
that the word 'association' as used in the act, clearly includes
•Massachusetts trusts' such as those herein involved, having
quasi-corporate organizations under which they are engaged in
carrying on business enterprises." No reference was made by
the court to the control vested in the beneficiaries, which is
one of the tenets of the Massachusetts control test. In fact
trusts were declared to be associations independently of the
large measure of control exercised by the beneficiaries.
1. See brief of this case in Appendix

This indicates an intention to drop that requirement. Therefore
a trust that operates a business enterprise and is a quasi-
corporation in form is an association. The character of the
trust's activities has supplanted the control t«st, prior to
this ct se, the Massachusetts trust was not taxable as a
corporation under the federal revenue acts.
District Judge Norton in iVhite, collector of Internal
Revenue v. Hornblower, 21 F. (2d) 82^ said: "The dictum in the
opinion in the Hecht Case is based on the assumption that a
strict trust is an association within the meaning of the
Massachusetts statutes, and that such a trust is an
association taxable und^r the federal statutes. This is a
mistaken assumption," The Costilla Estate Development Company
was the organization in question. It came before the court on
a taxing statute, Y;heth3r this Massachusetts trust was subject
to the Stamp Act imposed by the Acts of 1918 on the issue of
stock by a corporation. The word 'corporation' vms defined to
include associations. The court held that this Massachusetts
trust was not an association, since the beneficiaries had no
pov/er to control the acts of the trustees in any way, and there
was no association among the cestuis.
In Neal v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 708,2 District
Judge Brewster reiterated the Massachusetts lav/ when he
declared; "Not only in the interest of uniformity, but in
the belief that the distinction dravm between associations
1 and 2, See briefs of these cases in Appendix
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and express trusts is sovmd in principle, i am prepared to concur
in the views expressed in Hornblov;er v, ,vhite, 21 F, (2d) 32,
and in Bouchard v. First People's Trust, 253 Mass. 351. The
government contends that the olassificiation must be determined
with reference to the purposes of the trust, or the nature and
extent of the activities of the trustees carried on in pursuance
of those purposes. Neither Hecht v, Malley, 265 U. 3. 144 or
Burk-Waggoner Association v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, support
this contention. In the latter case, Mr. Justice Brandeis
points out that the Burk-Vfaggoner Association is an unincorporat-
ed joint-stock association, like those described in Hecht v,
Malley, supra, and these trusts were distinguished by Judge
Lov/ell from the trust before the court in the case of Horn-
blower V. White, supra.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, supra. He
settled in that decision the right of Congress to tax any
organization, be it an association or a trust, thus avoiding
the discussion as to the distinction between a trust and an
association, Mr. Justice Brandeis held: "Unincorporated Joint
stock associations, although technically partnerships, are not
in common ptrlance referr
-d to as such. Nothing in the
Constitution precludes Congress from taxing as a corporation
an association, vrhich, although unincorporated, transacts its
business as if it v/ere incorporated. The po..ers of Congress
to tax associations is not affected by the fact thc;t, under
the law of a particular state, the association cannot hold

title to property, or that its shareholders are individually-
liable for the association's debts, or that it is not recognized
as a legal entity. Neither the conception of unincorporated
associations prevailing^ under the loct^l law, nor the relation
under that lav/ of the association to its shareholders, nor
their relation to each other and to outsiders, is of le^;al
significance as bearing upon th-^ pov/er of Congress to determine
how and at what rate the income of the joint enterprise shall be
taxed."
In Fisk V. United States, 60 F. (2d) 665, the Massachusetts
control test was expressed as based upon (a) the measure of
control over the trustees which the shareholders may exercise,
and (b) the extent and character of the pov/er s conferred upon
the trustees.
The Massachusetts control test vms the determining factor
in the decision in ?fillis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
68 F. (2d) 121, where the Commissioner taxed the income of
the trust under the claim that the organs zation was an
association. Since the trustees were given broad po.vers to
fill vacancies caused by the r-tirenent of any trustee, to
borrow money, to use capital or income in the improvement of
the property; in brief, complete control, the organization
was a trust, and the income would be taxable.
The decision in the iiecht case is the only one which
ignores the Massachusetts control test. The determining test
of the right to tax was based upon the type of business the
1. See brief of this case in Appendix.

the trustees carried on; that is, if the organization was a
business organization Congress had a right to levy a tax, on
the theory that it was a business venture. The Massachusetts
distinction between an association and a common lav/ trust was
not discussed. Th:re was much dissatisfaction over this
decision. Business men sjid lav.yers here in Massachusetts
ere greatly perturbed, and it was of great significance to
them that Mr, Justice Holmes and Mr, Justice Brandeis, both
formerly Massachusetts lav^yers, took no part in the decision
handed down in this Hecht Case, Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Burk-Waggoner Oil Association, supra, did not mention the
distinction between an association and a common law trust.
This demoting of the Massachusetts control test by the
Supreme court led to the passage of th . Revenue Act of 1926,
Regulation 65, Article 1314, which is quoted here in full:
"Association Distinguished from Trusts, where trustees
merely hold property for the collection of the income and its
destribution among the beneficiaries of the trust, and are not
engaged, either by themselves or in connection v/ith the
beneficiiaries, in the carrying on of any business, and the
beneficiaries have no control over the trust, although their
consent may be required for the filling of a vacancy among the
trustees or for a modification of the terms of the trust, no
association exists, and the trust and the beneficiaries thereof
will be subject to tax as provided by Sections 161-170 and by
Articles 861-891. If, however, the beneficiaries have positive
control over the trust, wheth r through the right periodically
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to elect trustees or otherwise, eoi association exists within the
meaning: of section 701.
TvTO tests (1) the businesstest, as to v.hether or not the
organization formed to do business in an organized capacity and
for the distribution of the profits among the shareholders in
proportion to the investment or shares; (2) is for the purpose
of distinguishing an association from a trust, and depends upon
the question of v/hethor or not the beneficiaries have positive
control over the trust, whether through the right periodically
to elect trustees, or othenvise."
Thus the Massachusetts control test was incorporated into
the federal law. This control test, a judicial yardstick, is
a contribution from Massachusetts lavjyers to the science of
jurisprudence, and it is in appreciation of what these men
have done that these common law trusts are known throughout
the United States as Massachusetts trusts.
Joint Stock Company. There is another form of business
organization, the joint stock company, which is a species of
partnership, and is an important membor of our Massachusetts
family of business orgeinizations.
A joint stock company is sn association of individuals for
purposes of profit, possessing a common capital contributed by
members composing it, such capital being divided into shares of
which each member possesses one or more, and which are trans-
1
ferable by the owner.
1. 38 Corpus juris 878

It is interesting to note that the term "joint Stock company" has
been applied to all business associations v;ith transferable shares,
since the famous "South Sea Bubble" in the reign of Queen Anne.
In the early Massachusetts statutes a joint stock company was
1
equivalent to a corporation organized under our General Laws,
but it did not include those established under special charters.
The earliest statute. First Statute, 1851, chapter 133, section
4, under which individuals were authorized to form a corporation
without the formality of a special charter, required a certifi-
cate to be furnished by a voluntary joint stock company before
comraencing business, to be filed in the office of the secretary
of the Commonwealth before any part of the capital stock was
paid.
These facts led to some confusion in reading the early
cases. Today corporations are organized linder our General
Laws. A corporation is an artifical entity brought into
existence by the sovereign power of the state, and the
individual liability of its members is completely eliminated;
vinless some part of that liability is expressly preserved by
constitutional or statutory provision; while a joint stock
company is formed by a written agreement of individuals with
each other. Its whole force and effect, in constituting and
creating the organization, rest upon the common law right of
individuals to contract with each other. The relation they
assxuae is wholly the product of their mutual agreement, and
depends in no respect upon any grant of authority from the
state. They possess the following characteristics: (1)
1. Attorney General v. Mercantile Co., 121 Mass. 524

they may transact business under an artifioal name, (2) the capital
and ownership are represented by shares of stock transferable at
will, (3) they possess the right of perpetual succession and their
existence is not dissolved or affected by death or by transfer of
the interest of a member,
A joint stock company has sometimes been confused vd-th a
partnership. It is not an ordinary partnership, but is a species
of partnership, as the mebers are partners; therefore the rules
of partnership law are applicable, except to the extent where the
partners have modified these laws "by agreement, Mr. Justice
Brandies in Burk-Waggoner Association v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. HO,
stated: "unincorporated joint stock associations, although
technically partners, are not in ooiinion parlance referred to as
such."^
Ov/nership is represented by transferable shares, v.^hich
elininates the delectus personarum; the outstanding advajitage
of a partnership, for a partner cannot force the vdthdrawal of
another partner, nor can he withdraw himself from the firm and
substitute another person in his place. His death v/orks a
dissolution of the partnership, ejid unsurmountable disadvantage
of the partnership type of organization.
Title to the assets of the business are usually vested in
persons vfho are sometimes called trustees. This fact has lead
to the erroneous belief that a common law trust and a joint
stock company were the same type of organization. The out-
standing characteristic of the joint stock company is that
the shareholders may at any time direct and control the actions
of the trustees. This determines its legal status; for joint
stock companies were recognized by the Massachusetts courts as
1. See brief of this case in Appendix
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early as Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510, vAen Judge
Oliver A'endall Holmes said: "It is too late to contend that
partnerships viith transferable shares are illegal in this
C onunonwe alth .
"
Partnerships vdth transferable shares have the advajitage
of continutiy in the conduct of the business. This corporate
advantage is obtained by agreement. The shareholders may agree
that the interest of each partner shall be represented exclu-
sively by transferable shares and that no holder of such shares
shall have a right to call for a dissolution of the firm. If a
partner wishes to retire, he may sell his certificates. Upon
his death, there is no liquidation, no momentary interruption
in the conduct of the business, for the transferee of his
shares becomes a partner. This secures continuity in the
conduct of the business.
Distinction between a Joint Stock Company and a Trust.
2Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, is the leading case
distinguishing a joint stock company from a business trust.
The question before the court was whether personal property
held by trustees was ta:xable as trust property or as
partnership property. The court recognized that the legis-
lature might provide that trust property which w: s not
partnership property should be treated as partnership
property for the purpose of taxation, but after an examination
of the statutes, it concluded that it had not done this, and
had provided that the taxability of property as trust property
or as partnership property should depend upon the real charac-
ter of the property. The court was of the opinion that if the
1 and 2. See briefs of these cases in Appendix

certificate holders are associated together by terms of the trust
and are the principals whose instructions are to be obeyed by
their agents who for their convenience hold the legal title to
their property, then the property is their property; they are
the masters, and it is a real partnership. But if the property
is the propertj)- of the trustees, and the trustees are the
masters, if all that the certificate holders have is a right to
have the property managed by the trustees for their benefit, and
if. they have no right either to manage the property themselves or
to instruct the trustees how to manage it, then it is a real
trust.
This opinion is often quoted, for it gives a clear summary
of what was later called the Massachusetts control test.
In Dunbar v. firoomfield, 247 Mass. 372, all po wers are
vested exclusively in the trustees, except that confirmatory
action by the certificate holders was required for a change
in the terms of the trust, and for the appointment of a new
trustee. The court declared this organization to be a common
law trust.
The Supreme Court of the united states stated the law in
2Crocker v. Mai ley, 249 U. S. 223; "Under the Massachusetts
decisions these trust instruments are held to create either
pure trusts or partnerships, according to the way in which the
trustees are to conduct the affairs committed to their charge.
__If they are the principals and are free from the control of the
certificate holders in the management of the property, a trust
is created; but if the certificate holders are associated
1 and 2. See briefs of these cases in Appendix.

together in the control of the property as principals and the
trustees are merely their managing agents, a partnership
relation between the certificate holders is created."
In Priestley v. Treasurer ^ Receiver General, 230 Mass.
452, only a partial statement of the many powers in the
certificate holders is made in the opinion of the court. The
record shows that the Warren chambers declaration of trust
provided that at any annual meeting or special meeting of
shareholders they may fill any vacancy existing in the niraiber
of trustees; they may remove any or all of the trustees and
elect others in their places; they may authorize a sale or
additional mortgage of the real estate, or any part thereof,
held by the trustees; they may authorize or instruct the
trustees to purchase and build upon additional real estate
and issue additional shares for that purpose and may alter or
amend this declaration of trust or substitute a new one in
place thereof. These powers of management made this organization
a partnership, not a trust.
Mr. Justice Rugg in Flint v. Codman, 247 Mass. 463, held
that the declaration of trust gave the shareholders the control
of all affairs of the trust, resulting in a partnership type of
organization. The deed stated that the trustees were required
to call meetings of the shareholders upon request of the holders
of one -twentieth of the shares, and, at any meeting of the
shareholders they might fill any vacancy existing in the number
of trustees, depose any or all of the trustees and elect others
in their places, authorize the sale or mortgage of the trust
1. see brief of this case in Appendix.

property, or any part thereof, alter or amend the agreement, or
terminate the trust.
In the cases cited the court has applied the Massachusetts
control test in determining the legal status of an organization.
Wo distinction was made between an ordinary partnership and a
joint stock company. Because a joint stock company is formed
under a deed of trust with ownership of shares evidenced by
transferable certificates, it has been confused with a common
law trust, A Massachusetts trust is not a joint stock company,
although there are a few elements which are common to both.
It is usual in a joint stock company, as in a common law
trust, to concentrate the pov/er of management in a selected
few. This has been clearly expressed in an English case,
Burnes v. ponnell, 2 F. L. Cas, 487, v;here Lord Campbell said:
"A distinction must be made betv.een a member of a common
mercantile partnership and a shareholder in a joint stock
company. No one will content that a joint stock company would
be liable on a bill of exchange, drai-m, accepted, or indorsed
by any one shareholder, Why? Because it is knov/n that the
power of carrying on the business of the company, and of
drawing, accepting, and indorsing bills of exchange, is vested
exclusively in the directors. This shows that, although a
joint stock company is a partnership, it is a partners;^ip of a
different description, and attended with different incidents
and liabilities from a partnership constituted between persons
who carry on business jointly, with equal pov/ers and without
transferable shares. All who have dealings with joint stock
companies know that the authority to manage the business is

conferred upon the directors, and that a shar9holder, as such
has power to contract for the company. For this purpose it is
wholly immaterial whether the corapany is incorporated or un-
incorporated, "
This concentration of power of management in a few, v/ho are
sometimes called trustees, has led to the erroneous belief that
a joint stock company and a trust were one and the sanie. But a
true joint stock company has always had the status of a partner-
ship, while the trust has sometimes had this partnership status
thrust upon it.
The elementary rule of partnership is that a partner is
liable upon evory partnership liability to ths last penny of
his fortune, unless there has been a lawful agreement with
the partnership creditor to the contrary. His own intent is
not the deciding point; the court will decide whether he has
so conducted himself that a partnership is the result. This
rule applies to joint stock companies.
Joseph Story in his text on partnership. Chapter VII,
Paragraph 164, is often quoted: "In joint stock and other
large companies, v^hich are not incorporated, but are a
simple, although aji extensive partnership, their liabilities
to third persons are generally governed by the same rules and
principles, which regulate common commercial partnerships. In
such companies the fundamental articles generally divide the
stock into shares, and make them transferable by assignment or
delivery; and the whole business is conducted by a select board
of trustees or directors, without undertaking to assert in v.-^hat

cases such companies may or may not be deemed illegal, and
the members liable to be treated as xmiversally responsible,
upon the ground of usurping and attempting to exercise the
proper functions of a corporation, which the legislature or
government is alone competent to establish; it may well
deserve inquiry, how far any stipulation in those articles,
and which limit the responsibility of the members to the mere
joint funds, or to a qualified extent, will be binding upon
their creditors, who have notice of such a stipulation, and
contract their debts with reference thereto. This question,
many years ago, was presented to the Supreme Court of the
United States; but the cause went off without any decision
upon the point. Mandeville v. Riggs, 3 Cranch 183.
"It seems to have been thought, that such a stipulation
can in no wise operate as a limitation of the general
liability of all the partners for all their debts, even though
the creditors have full notice thereof. It may, however, be
still deemed an open question, whether creditors, with such
notice, can proceed against the members upon their general
responsibility, as partners, where they have expressly con-
tracted only to look to the social funds; and whether if
they have notice of the qualifying stipulation, and contract
with reference to it, it may not be easy to assign a reason,
why it does not amount to an implied agreement, to be bound
by it, as much as if it were expressly agreed to.
"There is certainly nothing illegal in a creditor's
agreeing to such a limited responsibility, as a qualification

or condition of his contract; and in many other analogous cases
contracts of this sort are deemed perfectly proper, and un-
exceptionable; as, for example, where a commission merchant
agrees to look exclusively to the goods for the reimbursement
of his advances; or a mortgagee agrees to look exclusively to
the mortgaged property for his debt. But a qualified agreement
of this nature must be proved and is never presvuned without
some reasonable proof thereof."
It is to be concluded, therefore, that the joint stock
company is a species of the partnership form of business
organization, and should not be confused with the pure
Massachusetts trust. The joint stock company has one
distinguishing feature, it attempts to limit the liability of
its shareholders, who are admittedly partners, by so stating
in its articles of agreement. Mr. Story questions the
legality of this. No case was found to settle the point,
whereas there are numerous cases, supra, where such qualifying
statements in trust agreements \vere of no avail.
There are four Massachusetts cases concerning Nev/ York express
companies, wherein the court simply stated such organizations were
partnerships in Massachusetts, making no mention of the limiting
liability clause in the articles of agreement.
In Taft V. V'/ard, 106 Mass. 518, the plaintiff, one Taft, con-
tended that the Defendants were suable as partners of the firm
known as the ^evr England Express Co., a joint stock association.
It was organized in New York under Statute of 1849, c. 258.
"Any joint stock company or association consisting of seven or

more shareholders or as'^ociates, may sue and be sued in the
name of the president or treasurer, for the time being, of
such joint stock company." Therefore the plaintiff could
not in this Commonwealth bring an action against the president
or secretary, for that is New York law. In Massachusetts
such a company is a partnership.
Bodwell T. Eastman f: Others, 106 Mass. 525, uterrly dis-
regarded the fact that a joint stock company limits the liability
of its shareholders. The plaintiff brought action against the
Defendant and sixteen others as copartners transacting business
at Boston under the firm name of the Nev/ England Express Co.
The court concluded: "The articles of agreement formed a
partnership. Therefore the liability of Eastman for the debt
of the plaintiff follows as a conclusion of lav/. He was
responsible for the acts of his partners vathin the scope of
the copartnership business; and they having appointed agents,
the partnership and each partner is liable for the acts and
contracts within the scope of their employment."
The declaration of trust in Gott v. Dinsomore f,- Others,
111 Mass. 45, alleged that the Defendants were comiaon carriers,
doing business at Boston as a partnership or joint stock
association. This Adams Express Company was formed under the
laws of the State of New York. The Massachusetts court held
that the common law liability of the individual members or
stockholders, as partners, remains the same in Massachusetts,
regardless of statutory provisions in New York State.
The New England Express Company was sued in Boston Albany
R. R. V. Pearson & Others, 128 Mass. 445, as a partnership, with

the stockholders individually liable for the debts of the
organization.
This unavoidable disadvantaf;e inherent in the joint stock
company form of business organization is not always thoroughly
understood by the shar .holder , In comparing this type with our
subject, the common law trust, be it a pure Massachusetts trust,
can and does avoid this partnership liability by establishing
its status through the Mass chusetts control test.
This brings the analysis of Massachusetts forms of business
organization to a conclusion. The corporation has been purposely
omitted, for a common law trust could never be mistaken for a
corporation. The status of a corporation is determined by the
General Laws of the state of its incorporation, and only that
state can question its status after a charter is granted. In
answering the inquiry, "What is the legal status of the so-called
Massachusetts Trust," i have followed the method of the
Massachusetts courts by proving not only what it is but also
what it is not. As it was never thought to be a corporation,
I have omitted the corporation as a separate topic in this
thesis.
Much could be written about t}\e growth of tiais type of
organization, a common law trust which would embody the
advantages of the corporate form, and avoid the undesirable
liability of a partnership. But I atn reminded that these
are results of the legal status, and not tests by which that
status is determined. The courts have given us a test by
which that status can be determined, and the results there-
from must be the subject of further research.
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object. The object of this research was to detc-rrnine the
legal status of the so-called Massachusetts trust, vihat is a
legal status? Status means the state, condition or relation of
an organization or person to all other organizations or persons
found in that particular coromonwealth. The word "legal" is
almost superfluous, for the analysis of the status of a business
organization would be based upon its legal state, condition, or
relation to other business organizations. Hence the necessity
of setting up an organization structure and giving the common
law trust its rightful place therein. This place is determined
by the law.
There are two sources of our laws, the written constitution
and the statutes, and the uniiVTitten, or common law. It was found
that the General Laws of Massachusetts gave no directions for
placing this common law organization in its rightful status among
Massachusetts business organizations. Hence, resort must be had
to the common law.
The common law gives a history of the trust movement, from
its beginnings in Rome to the Statutes of Uses in England. This
places the trust in its rightful historical setting, and explains
the reason why all trusts come within the jurisdiction of the
equity court. This historical backgroiind does explain the
references in the decisions of the appellate courts, where we
must go to find the principles which vd.ll determine the legal
status of the trust today.
Business men, with the aid and advice of their lawyers,
have taken this trust organization and given it a place among

the individual proprietorships, the partnerships, and the
corporations, making it serve as a form of business organization
with advantages accruing to the -organizers which could not be
obtained from any other type. Yet they cannot determine its
legal status. This is left to the courts, and they will not
interfere until after the business is organized and functioning.
Then, if a point of law arises, the court will determine the
status of the organization, since there are no written laws in
Massachusetts which demand that a trust do thus and so, in order
to function as a trust, it is left to the organizers to follow
the common law principles of trust organizations.
»
This is in direct contract to partnerships, and their
associates, the associations, and the joint stock companies.
The Uniform partnership Act is a codification of the cammon
law. Legislators have put into written form the rules that
govern this type of business organization. However, this act
does not determine the partnership status before it begins to
function, as the laws governing corporations do. The corpora-
tion is a child of the state; it cannot exist without its
sanction, but two or three persons may form a partnership, which
to all intents and purposes is a partnership, and after such
formation the law states what the results v/ill be. It is the
same with the common law trust. Its status is determined after
its organization, then if it comes before the courts on any
question which makes it pertinent to determine v/hether it is a
partnership or a trust, the court will a. ply the control test
and render a decision. Thus it can be said with truth that
the courts determine the legal status of a common law trust.
It is only through the study of these decisions that the

rule applied by the courts can be found. There are more such
cases to be found in Massachusetts, where the common luw trust
has been growing more popular every year. Hence, the term
used by the lawyers throughout the country, Massachusetts trust.
This terminology has led to the misconception that this type of
orgemization was allowed in Massachusetts only. This is at once
dispelled when it is understood that this trust is based upon
common law principles, and the common law is the rightful
heritage of ev )ry state in the Union, with the single exception
of the state of Louisiana, where such a common law trust as a
business organization is ^Jlknown.
Then, too, Massachusetts courts have been called upon so
often to decide the status of such an organization that they
devolved the control test, which is their official yardstick.
This has been accepted by the Supremo Court of the United
States, during the time when Mr, Chief Justice Oliver Wendall
Holmes and Mr, Justice Brandeis, both Massachusetts lawyers,
were sitting on the bench. The only dissenting opinion handed
down was that in the Crocker case, to which both Mr. Chief
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented, since that
decision Congress has included the Massachusetts control test
in its Revenue Laws, distinguishing between an association, which
is a partnership, and a common lav/ trust. Therefore, it can be
said without fear of contradiction that the control test as
applied by the Massachusetts courts is the test which determines
the legal status of the common law trust.
There are tv/o separate and distinct features of this test,
one depending upon the other. If the cestuis have an

association together whereby they may control the affairs of the
trust by giving directions to the trustees in any matters what-
soever, the courts of Massachusetts wil] consider such an
organization a partnership. This is because a partnership is
an association of tv/o or more persons to carry on a business for
profit. It is usual in an ordinary partnership to find the title
of the partnership property vested in tho names of the partners,
for Massachusetts does not consider a partnership a separate
entity, although Mr. Justice Brandeis said in his dissenting
opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 TJ, S. 189, "There is much
authority for the proposition that, under our law, a partner-
ship or joint stock company is just as distinct and palpable
an entity in the idea of law, as distinguished from the
individuals composing it, as is a corporation." Massachusetts
has not accepted this opinion, however.
Therefore, if the cestuis, who are the owners of the
corpus of the trust, are associated together, and through
that association control the management of the business,
they are partners. This is the only difference between a trust
8Jid a joint stock company. Both are organized xander a deed of
trust, or a declaration of trust, or sometimes merely called
an agreement. The ownership is represented by transferable shares,
which distinguishes this type of partnership from the ordinary
type. Death of a rtner works a dissolution, but in a joint
stock company where ownership is represented by transferable
shares, the affairs of the concern are not interrupted by the
death of a shareholder. The deceased partner's share goes to
his executor to be later transferred to the rightful heir. In

both these organizations the affairs are administered by a small
group, siinilar to the directors of a corporation, in a common
law trust called the trustees, while in the joint stock company
they are usually called the menag;ers. In the joint stock
company, the shareholders never for one instant give up the
management of the business. They are associated together, and
are therefore partners, and control the acts of their managers.
In a pure trust, this can not be so, for it is the dividing
line between a partnership and a trust. The purpose of a trust
is to avoid the unlimited liability of partners, and every trust
deed states this emphatically. The courts have held this state-
ment not to be sufffc lent. These v/ords of limitation may express
the intention of the trustees and the cestuis,but if the cestuis
are not willing to give every vestage of control of the management
into the hands of the trustees, and in spite of the lajiguage
used in the trust deed, exert any of this control through an
association among themselves, the Massachusetts courts will hold
such ah organization to be a partnership.
After reading the cases briefed in the Appendix, it would
seem a fairly simple matter to comply with the Massachusetts
regulation. This has not proved true, however. The trust
deeds that have been scrutinized by the courts have in almost
every case been foxmd to be partnerships. It is difficult to
find cases that were adjudged pure trusts, bringing us to the
conclusion that it is a difficult matter to v;rite and comply
with an agreement that will bear the scrutiny of the court.
The Boston Property T^ust deed found in the Appendix is
quoted as a model. That is a pure coimnon law trust, fulfilling

the requirements of the Massachusetts law. The words of limita-
tion are expressed clearly, and the oestuis did not attempt to
control the management. In all probability many such trusts
are in existence today; for if the organization fxinctions
without dispute, the question as to its legal status never
arises. The courts will not interfere with such an organiza-
tion, they render decisions only upon questions that are
brought to them. Usually these questions are upon the inter-
pretation of a taxing statute, where in order to determine the
state's authority to tax, the legal st^^^tus of the organization
must be detennined first. This is what complicates the whole
investigation. The trustee has the legal title to all the
trust property, and pays the taxes assessed by the city, state,
and federal government that any individual pays. His duty is
to so execute the trust that the income is paid to the cestuis
according to the terms of the trust deed. The cestuis have a
remedy in equity, if the trustee is negligent. The laws that
govern a trustee's duty to his cestuis are the same laws that
govern any trustee, whether in a testamentary trust which
conducts no business, or in a trust that is a business venture.
It is plain that both the ce tuis and trustees should
thoroughly understand this control test as applied by our
Massachusetts courts and the Federal courts before f orraing
such an organization- It is not enough to express an intention
in the trust deed, that intention must be rigidly adhered to
during the life of the trust.

Value of this Research. Research of any kind brings with
it certain definite benefits, which are the results of the v\fork
so carried on, irrespective of the subject matter. Research is
a concentrated effort to find out everything possible about one
particular subject. However, if the mechanics of research were
the only benefits, there might be a question as to its ultimate
value, (jn the other hand, data found in such research is of
little importance, for a memory knowledge of facts does not
add to the sum total of one's education. It is the correlation
of these new facts with v;hat one has acquired elsewhere that
makes research of this type worthwhile, for one is reminded
that a good lawyer does not keep his law in his head, but at
hand.
The subject of this research, The Legal Status of the
Common Law Trust, was a happy choice. Following the advice
of an instructor in law school, I set out to find not only
vtfhat type of business organization this trust is, but also
its points of similarity and difference to the more familiar
types of organizations. Herein lies the constructive value
of this study.
There are three well knov.Ti types of business organizations
in Massachusetts today, the individual proprietorship, the
partnership, and the corporation. They are the best known
because when seeking advice about the legal status of these
organizations, the lawyers point out the advantages of each.
These advantages do not determine the legal status, they are
the results thereof. Therefore, any investigation which

detennines the legal status of eja organization gathers with
it the advantages and disadvantages, and gives the investigator
a broader comprehension of all existing types of organizations.
The student of business is interested in a comparison of
these forms. The individual proprietorship is the oldest and
perhaps the most ideal. The responsibility, the decisions
which will either result in losses or profits balong to the
one individual. He has the satisfaction of creating, and
carrying on through his own efforts an organization which is
wholly his. The partnership form brings with it advantages
and disadvantages, an increase in capital, and a sharing of
profits, management, and responsibility. The success of a
partnership depends upon the character and ability of the
partners, and because so much depends upon personal
characteristics of the individuals, this type of organization
should be well understood before venturing upon it. The
records are full of disasters. It was my privilege to have
been consulted by a partnership that had been advised to in-
corporate. These two partners had been in business very
successfully for fifteen years. Neither had any dependents,
who would be harmed from an abrupt dissolution of the firm by
death, if the firm property had to be sold immediately. They
had never had any reason during these years to question each
other's integrity and their ideas coincide upon the important
is-sues in the conduct of their business. The title to partner-
ship property is divided between them, and the taxes are paid
from firm funds. They have always kept very accurate partner-
ship books. What type of business organization was best for

their particular needs? since I was questioning everyone I
came in contact v/ith about corruaon law trusts, I added this
question. I found the comparisons I had made between
partnerships and common law trusts had emphasized the
advantages and disadvantages to a degree that a disconnected
study in law school had not revealed, proving that this
research was not merely abstract knowledge. Whereas this is
a personal advantage, I believe it would accrue to any student
of business who wished to make a comprehensive study of the
various types of business organizations v/hich are most popular
today.
The outstanding value of this research has been the
correlation of the work I had done at Boston University and
Portia Law school. I studied accounting for individual
proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations at Boston
University. At Portia Law school I learned how to form such
organizations. Then back at Boston University while studying
for a Master's Degree, I learned that there was an organization
known as a Massachusetts trust. My lav/ text books dismissed
it with the statement that it was neither a partnership nor a
corporation, but an orgfoiization with the characteristics of
each, and standing in the twilight zone between the tv/o.
Thh't definition, like so many found in law text books, meant
absolutely nothing, until I began this thesis. I was nonplused
to find that there was no topic "Massachusetts trust" in the
law encyclopaedia. Corpus Juris. Heretofore 1 started einy
search from Corpus Juris. Librarians and even some lawyers
answered that they had never heard of a Massachusetts trust.

Yet the Department of Corporations and Taxation at the state
House was registering the fact that these Massachusetts trusts
were being organized in increasing numbers every year. These
trusts are known by so many names, the common lav/ trust, un-
incorporated association, voluntary association, and the so-
called Massachusetts trust, that at first it was confusing.
There is very little information to be found outside the
case reports on this subject. It is difficult to estimate the
value of such reading, for cases contain so much more infor-
mation than the ansv/er to the question I wss searching for.
For instance, I have read and briefed many cases on the
liability of a trustee, which may be an extension of this
work, but does not belong here, for it is not a factor in
determining the status of an organization, but the result of
that status. Then the subject of taxation, which I also
omitted, was the reason in many cases for the court inquiry.
Every response to my question. Why did you organize as a
Massachusetts Trust instead of a corporation, v/as, in order to
avoid corporate taxation. Many bank affiliates are organized
as Massachusetts trusts with the bank itself a corporation.
The tendency of the present administration at Washington to look
upon bankers as trustees of their depositors' funds, to insist
upon a fiduciary relationship, rather than merely a business
one, may bring about great changes in our banking structure.
The statement that I knew nothing about common law trusts
when I began this study is absolutely true. The word "trust"
is used in so marry connections that I spent considerable time
comparing the comnion law trust, a business organization, with

other trust organizations. The very noticeable change in
public opinion regarding the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws is bound
to bring results. Then the irisurance companies are employing
experts on testamentary trusts, and advisinf] t}ieir clients to
leave their insurance in this form. The spendthrift trust is
looked upon with favor in Massachusetts. All this reading
brought out the difference betv^een active and passive trusts.
During my four years at Portia Law School we talked a
great deal about common law, and I v;ould have defined it quite
glibly as unwirtten law; but I have found that expressions in
themselves add little to a thorough comprehension of a subject.
I read Oliver Wendall Holmes, "History of the Common Law,"
Roscoe Pound, "Common Law," and everything I had time for
from the pen of Joseph Story. This I presume might be termed
a history of the law, but this sti'tfiect was a common law
trust, and I had to find out what common law meant, not to
merely mouth the expression "unwritten law," The source of
all this research has really been the case reports, and they
are the common law as the Massachusetts appellate courts are
recording it every day.
This brings to a close this thesis. I have attempted to
analyse how the legal status of a common law trust is determin-
ed by first defining a trust, then by explaining -vdi&t is meant
by a common la-, trust, and finally by analysing the cases that
establish the control test, hich has made the Massachusetts
Trust an organization known throughout the United stctes.
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The Boston Personal Property Trust
Common Lav/ by Joseph Story

Bouohard v» First People's Trust, 253 Mass. 351 (1925)
The First People's Trust was formed by the execution of a declaration
of trust dated October 28, 1U19, The declaration was signed by five individ-
uals named therein as trustees and by no others. The numbur of trustees may
lie increased or diminished by a majority vote of the trustees in office, but
:iever can exceed fifteen, nor be permanently less than five. The purpose of
;he trust is "to undertake and carry on anywhere any business, transaction or
operation which an individual could legally tmdertake or oeurry on conform-
ably to the law of the land where the business transaction or operation it
undertaken and carried on,"
The trustoes are given broad powers to acquire, buy, sell and othor-
vdse deal with property of the trust to tho same extent as if they were
absolute owners* Vacancies in the tm^stees arising from any cause are to
be filled by a majority vote of the trustees then in office. Any trustee
may be removed by unanimous action of all the remaining trustees* The
trustees avo not entitled as such to share in profits or in distribution
of principal, "and shall not be liable for losses and shall not be partners
of each other or in association v/ith each other." Certificates are to be
issued to shareholders, transferable on the books of trustees when properly
indorsed. Owners of shares are c lied "cestuis que trust or beneficiaries."
They are declared to be "trust beneficiaries only and to the extent" defined
in the instrument and "not partners or associates or in any other relation
whatever between themselves with respect to the trust property." They have
no legal interest in the trust assets, have no share in profits as such and
are not liable for losses. There is no {.revision for the holding of any
meeting of the shareholders or the performance of any act v^^atever concern-
ing the management, continuance or termination of the trust or its property
or the trustees. Their only legal rights are to receive such dividends as
may be declared and to share in any partial or final distribution of the

Bouchard v. First People* s Trust, 253 M&sb, 351 (continued)
assets of the trust according to th prefarenoea established vfith respect
to the several classes of stock* all in accordance with the discretion of
tho trustoGs. The declaration of trust may bo amended by the unanimous
action of the trustees by complying with th'^ prescribed forms, one of
which is that such amondmont shall tako effect thirty days aft.r notice in
writing shall have been mailed to each shareholdor. The shareholders, hovr-
ever» have no povrer whatever respecting such amendment. Th-y are entitled
merely to receive a copy of it. The trust is to ond twenty years after
tho death of described individuals, or earlier upon vote of the trustees.
General Laws of Massachusetts, chapter 182, paragraph 6, states: "An
association may be sued in an action at law for debts and other obligations
or liabilities contracted or incurred by the trustees, or by the duly
authorized agents of such trustees, or by any duly authorized officer of
the association* in the performanco of their respective duties under such
written insti*iment or declaration of trust* and for any damages to persons
or property resulting from tho negligence of such trustees, agents or
officers acting in the performance of their respective duties, and its
property shall be subject to attachment and execution in like manner as
if it wore a corporation, and service of process upon one of the trustees
shall be sufficient."
Chapter 182, Section 1 of the same General Laws defines an assooiationn
as "a voluntary association under a written instrument or declaration of
trust, the beneficial interest under which is divided into transferable
certificates of participation or shares."
The precise point to b.: decided is v.hether the First People's Trust
is an "association" within the meaning of that vord in the tv/o sections of
the statute. This court (Supreme Judicial Couirt) has nev^r been required
to decide that point. Commonly the inquiry has been to determine whether
the particular method of organization or establishment constituted the
hareholders partners or pure beneficiaries lander a trust.

Bouchard v. First People»8 Trust, Zb-'i Mass* 361 (continued)
All our relevant decisions rendered prior thereto were reviewed with
acute thoroughnoss by Mr, Justice Loring in '.villieoas v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1,
and in Dana v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 227 Liass. bti2.
There is a soimd and well-recognized distinction betv/een a voluntary
association and an express trust even though both are established by
written instrmnent or declarations of trust, manap;ed by trustees, and the
beneficial interest whereof is divided into shares represented by trans-
forablo certificates or shares.
Chief Just Shaw in Lechmore Bank v« Boynton, 11 Gush. 369, Sc^id:
"An association ex vi termini emplies agreement, compact, union of mind,
and purpose, and action."
Chief Justice Holmes in CoraKion'.vealth v. Rozen, 176 Mass. 129, statedi
"We may extend the word association* to include associations vdthout as
well as with officers."
In Williams v. Milton, 2i5 Mass. 1 en express trust with shares was
under exaxrd.nation. The deed of trust stated that the certificate holders
are in no way associated togeth r, nor is there any provision in the
indenture for any meoting to bo held by them. Th : only act which thoy can
do is to consent to an alterfc^tion or amondment of the trust, or to a
termination of tt before the time fixed in the deed. The solo right of
the cestui que trust is to have the property administered in their interest
by the trustees, //ho are the masters to recive income while the trust
lasts, and their share of the corpus when the trust comes to an end.
Th * declaration of trust in th.^ case at bar is different from any
hitherto considered by this court, in that the shareholders are utterly
destitute of every legal right and of ev:ry means of expressing an opinion
touching the trust. Ho avenue of action occurs to us as open to thorn
except a court of equity for the enforcoraent of whatever rights may be
cognizable in a court of equity. In this r- spect it bears resemblance to
Mayo V. Moritz, 151 Mass. 481. it is distinguisablo from the trusts

Bouoharo y. First People's Trust, 26^ Ma3»* 351 (continued)
Involved in Hooht v« Malloy, 265 U. 144 where reference is made to the
large measure of control exercised by the benefioiari s.
The sharohoidora under this declaration ar? unassooiuted. They have
no organization, each of th m has simply an equitable interest in the
trust. The various difinitiona of the word "association" all imply, if
thy do not require, as an essential olemont, that there be some form of
organization resembling modes of procedure inherent in inoorport^ted
bodies.
The trustoes can hardly be termed an association. Thoy have no
personal or beneficial interest in the corpus of the trust. To call such
trustees an association would involve an extension of the meaning of that
word in includo porsons who act Jointly for many purposes quite remote
from resemblance to th? present trustees.
The result is that the First people's Trust is not an association
within the meaning of General Laws, chapter 182, paragraph 6.

Burk-waggoner Oil Aoaooiation v. Hopkins, 269 U. ->. 109 (1925)
Mr. Justice Brandeia delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court
i
unincorporated Joint stock associations, althought technically partnerships,
are not in common parlance referred to as such.
nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from taxing as a
corporation an association, which, although unincorporated, transacts its
business as if it were incorporated. The po^jvers of Congress so to tax
associations is not affected by the fact that, under the law of a particular
state, the association cannot hold title to property, or that its share-
holders are individually liable for the association's debts, or that it is
not recognized as a legal entity. Neither the conoeption of unincorporated
associations prevailing under the local law, nor the relation under that
law of the association to its shareholders, nor their relation to each
other and to outsiders, is of legal significance as bearing upon the pov/er
of Congress to determine how and at what rate the income of the joint
enterprise shall be taxed.

Conr.onv^alth v. Loaoh, 1 Maoa. 59
Defendants ware Indicted in th© Court of General sessions for poison-
Ing a cow, the property of A» The defense w&o the.t thio was a coiwaon
law offence and that, ^uatioos of the peaoo wore officero not laaoim to tha
oommon law, but vrere oroated by stututOf snd that nok*o of our statute s had
givon them .juriodlotion over the offence charged in the indictment.
In the act for establishing Courts of General sessions of the Peace,
passed July 3, 1782 (Statute 1782, chapter 14) by the first sootion "they
are empowered to hear and detv^rmine all mattors relative to the oonseinration
of the ptaoe, and the pvuiishraent of such offences as are ootTiizable by them
at common law, or by the acta and Itcvn of the legislature, end to give
Judgment, eto«" In this act* tho tona ooramon law cannot meun the conunon
law of England, because Justices of the peace there are not common law
officers. It must, therefore, mean our common law; and our oom.non law
must be precisely vi^at the statute law of England was at the time of the
emigration of our ancestors from that coxmtry.
Chisholm V. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419
The Court defined the canmon law as "a law willoh I presume is the
groxmd work of the laws in ev ry state in the union, oad .vhioh I consider,
po far as it is applicable to the peouli£jr oirouastances of the country,
and where no special K.ot of legialc-tion caatrols it to be i^i Torc^ in
each State, as it existed In Sxiglfiad at th© tiiao of the first settlement
of the country,"

CoimnonwBAlth v, York, 9 Meto. 93
The rules and prlnoiples of the ooiBmon law of F4i{^,land have been adopted
by this Commonvrealth, so far as they are applicable to our condition, and
given them an authoritative and binding foroe and effoot. To this great
store house of learning, and intelligence we must resort, as well for the
rules and principles of law, as for the precedents* forms and modes of
practice, as thoy existed et the time of our revolution, and not since
otherwise provided for by statute* As this is an unwritten law, we must
seek for the evidence of it in ;judicial records, precedents, and decisions*
and those digests, treaties and commentaries, of learned and escperienced men*
which have acquired respect and confidence by long usage and general consent*
If we consult English decisions made since the revolution* it is not because
they have any binding force as rules, but because they are expositions of the
rules and : rinciples of the common law* by men of great experience and
^judgment in the knowledge and application of the same laws which we are
seeking to expound* And if we read the digests and treatises of reputable
authors* published since we ceased to be lilnglish subjects it is because they
contain the authentic records of the r reoedents and Judicial proceedings*
which furxiish the evidence of the common law*
copivjd verbatim from tho opinioT? of the oouri*..

Crocker v. Malley, 249 Mass, 223 (1919)
This is an action to recover tejces paid iinder protest to the Collector
of Internal Revenue by the plaintiffs* The taxes were assessed to the
plaintiff as a Joint stock company*
The wachusett Realty Trust was an ordinary real estate trust of the
kind familiar in r.ias sachusetts. The certificate holders are in no way
associated together* nor is there any provision in the instrument for any
meeting to be held by them* Williams v. Milton* 215 Mass. 1.
The trust would not fall under any familiar conception of a Joint
stock company, whether formed under a statute or not. Eliot v. Freeman,
220 U. S. 178.
The cestuis are admitted not to be partners in any sense, -^liien they
have no Joint action or interest and no control over the fund.
Trustees and associations acting in a fiduciary capacity have the
exemption that individual stockholders have from taxation upon dividends
of a corporation that itself pays an incomG tax, and as the plaintiffs
are trustees, if they are to be subjected to a double liability, the
language of the statute must make the intention clear.
Mr* Justice Holmes heldt We are of the opinion that the statute
fails to show a clear intent to subject the dividends on the Mass-
achusetts stock to the erbra tax imposed.

Flak V. United states, 60 F. (2d) 666 (1932)
Action by Fisk and others as trustees of the Main Street Trust to
recover income taxes for the year 1927 alleged to hare been illegally
assessed and collected.
The principle purpose of the Main streot trust was to liquidate the
real estate as fast as favorable offers were obtainable. The cash proceeds
of all sales were distributed among the beneficiaries as soon as received*
None of it was ever re-invested or used in any business for profit.
Under the terms the shareholders had no powers in connection with the
trust and no control over the trustees except to approve a trustee nominated
by the surviving trustees) to apply to the probate oourt for the appoint-
ment of a new trustee if the remaining trustees failed to fill a vacancy.
The Defendant claims that the Main Street Trust must be an association
and taxable imder the Revenue Act of 1926.
District Judge Brewster summarized the decisions in other districts
i
According to it, (Revenue Act), the classification turns (a) upon the
measure of control over the trustees which the shareholders may exercise;
and (b) upon the extent and character of the powers conferred upon the
trustees by the terms of the instrument creating the trust. It is now
pretty well settled that the test is not vdiat powers or authority reside in
the trustees or the shareholders, but as stated by Judge Anderson in Gardner
V. united states, 49 F. (2d) 992, "the crucial test must be found in what the
trustees actually do, not in the mere existence of long unused, broad powers.
Therefore, since the Main Street Trust was formed for the sole purpose
of liquidating, for distributing among the shareholders, reed estate which
had been devised to them by an ancestor, the trustees were never engaged in
any buslnesdfor profit* The activities in which the trustees engaged did
not constitute the carrying on of business within the meaning of this
regulation. Hence, the tax was illegally exacted.

proat V. Thompson, emd others, trusteos, 219 Mass. 360 (1914)
Bill in equity filed against the trustees of the Buena Yista Fruit
Co. wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover from the Defendant the balance
due on a i romi ; ory note si^ed, "The Buena Vista Fruit Co., G, L«
Dunnin^;^^, Treasurer."
The Buena Vista Fruit Co. is a voluntary association created under a
declaration of trust. Article XI reads-. All contracts and engagem nts
entered into by tho Trustees and all conveyances and instruments executed
by said Trustees shall be in their respective names as Trustees, and shall
provide against any personal liability on the part of the trustees, and
stipulate that no other property shall be answerable than the property in
the hands of the Trustees*"
Mr, Chief Justice Ruggi A declaration of trust or other instrument
providing for the holding of property by trustees for the benefit of the
owners of assignable certificates representing the beneficial interest in
the property may create a trust* or it may create a partnership* Vfhether
it is the one or the other depends upon the way in which the truste .s are
to conduct the affairs committed to their charge. If they act as principals
and are fr e from the control of the certificate holders* a trust is
created* but if they are subject to the control of the oertifioatc holders,
it is a partnership. That was explained at length in Wllllems v, Milton,
215 Mass. 1,
Tested by these principles* the Buena Vista Fruit Co. is a partner-
ship and not a trust. The declaration of trust provides that the share-
holders representing two-thirds in value of outstanding shares have power
to remove either or all of the trustees at any time, without assigning any
oauso, and to appoint others to fill the vacancy} to terminate the trust
at any time earlier than that limited for its dur tion in the declaration
of trust* and to terminate it by requiring conveyance of the property to
other trustees upon new trusts* or to a corporation. A majority of the

Frost Thompson, 219 Mass. 360 (oontlnued)
shareholders at any time by vote may amend the deolaratlon of trust*
The by-laws may be altered, amended« or repealed by vote of the majority
of the shareholders at any annual or special m/^tlng of the shareholders.
Those provisions demonstrate that this association is a partnership
and not a trust*
Tho note in suit is not the obligation of the trustees executed in
accordance w th th- power conferred in Article XI (supra), but the note
of the con^jany executed by its agent* Neither in fact nor in lugal con-
templation is it the note of thj trustees* It follows thtt the plaintiff
has not brought his case ithin the principle of law on which his bill is
framed and on which he recovered in the Superior court, viz., that when a
trustee has incurred an obligation in conducting the trust, the person to
whom that obligation is due can satisfy it out of the trust estate.
Hence, the decree in favor of the plaintiff is wrong, founded as it was
upon that principle of law.
Decree reversed.

Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 548 (1927)
plaintiff in error sued Mrs* Orloff* on her promissory note payable
to the Commoroial Investment Trust, or order, executed at Detroit,
Michigan, July 22« 1921 • She defended upon the ground, among others,
that the payee was a foreign corporation within the meaning of the
Michigan statutes; that it had not complied therewith; and* consequently
could not maintain the action*
The Commercial Investment Trust is of the class commonly known as
"Massachusetts trusts" or "common law trusts."
General Laws of Mass. 1921, Section 2 reads: The trustees of an
association shedl file a copy of the written instrximent or declaration of
trust creating it with the commissioner and with the clerk of every tovm
where such association has a usual place of business* The fee for filing
said copy with the commissioner shall hi fifty dollars*
Section 6i iUa association may be sued in an action at law for debts
and other obligations or liabilities contracted or incurred by the trustees,
or by the duly authorized agents of such trustees* or by ei^ duly authorized
officer of the association, in the performance of their respective duties
under such written instruments or declaration of trusts* end for any
damages to persons or property resulting from the negligence of such
trustees, agents or officers acting in the performance of their respective
duties* and its property shall be subject to attachment and execution in
like manner as if it were a corporation* and sorvioo of process upon one
of the trustees shall be sufficient*
The Massachusetts courts give effect to agreements like tho one here
described* recognise the entity of associations organized thereunder* and
hold both trustees and shareholders exempt from personal liability* See
Bussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass* 202. Williams v* Milton, 21& Mass. 1. Frost v.
Thon^son* 219 Mass. S60*
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Heraphill v, Orloff, 277 U. S. 548 (oontinuod)
plaintiff, in error, insists that, as construed by the Supreme Court,
the statutes of Michigan deny to the trustees, oolleotiTely called "Connaeroial
Investment Trust," the benefits of Paragraph 2, Article 4, of the Constitution,
"The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges end immunities
of citizens in the several states,"
It is settled doctrine that a corporation organized under the laws of
one state may not carry on local business within another without the latter*
s
permission, either express or implied* A corporation is not a mere collec-
tion of individuals capable of claiming all benefits assured them by Para-
graph 2a Article 4.
Obviously the trust here involved is a creature of local law which
demands the privilege of carrying on business in Michigan as an association*
an entity* clothed with peculiar rights and privileges under a deed of
settlement undertaking to exempt all of the associates from personal liabilll^*
As In the case of a corporation and for the same general reasons it cennot
rely upon rights guaranteed to the individuals.
Whether a given association Is called a oorporation» partnership, or
trust, is not the essential factor in determining the powers of a state con-
cerning It* The real nature of the organization must be considered* If
clothed with the ordinary functions and attributes of a corporation. It la
subject to similar treatment*
The commercial investment trust Is a business entity possessing the
attributes and facilities of a corporation, and the state of Michigan may
therefore require that it canply with the laws governing all foreign
corporations.

Heoht V, Malley, 265 U. S. 144 (1924)
on writs of certiorari to the united states Circuit Court of Appeals
for the First circuit to review JudfTnents reversing JudgTuents of the District
Court of Massachusetts in the plaintiff's favor in suits to recover taxes
alleged to havu been illegally exacted*
These four oaseSf which vrere heard together, involve the question
whether the trustees of thr-}* "Massachusetts trusts" are subjeat to the
special excise taxes imposed upon certain associations*
The "Massachusetts trust" is a form of business organization, coimaon
in that state* consisting essentially of an arrcmgeinent whereby property
is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with the terms of an instrument of
trust, to be hold and managed for the benefit of such persons as may, from
time to tim , be the holders of transferable certificates issued by the
trustees, showing the shares into which the beneficial interest in the
property is divided. These certificates, which resemble certificates for
shares of stock in a corport:tion, and are issued and transferred in like
manner, entitle the holders to share ratable in the inc(»ae of the property,
and, upon termination of the trust, in the proceeds.
l^der the Massachusetts decisions these trust instrizments are held to
create either pure trusts or partnerships, according to the way in which
the trustees are to conduct the affairs committed to their charge. If
they are the principals, and are free from the control of the certificate
holders in the management of the property, a trust is created; but if the
certificate holders are associated together in the control of tho property
as principals, and the trustees are merely their managing agents, a
partnership relation between the certificate holders is created.
Williams V. Milton, 215 Mass. Ij Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360j
Dana v. Treasurer, 227 Mass. 562 j Priestley v. Treasurer, 230 Mass. 462.

Heoht V. Malley, 265 U. S. 144 (oontinuod)
The Heoht Real Estate Trust was established by the members of th«
Heoht family upon real estate in Boston. The trustees have full and com-
plete powers of management, but no pov/er to create euiy liability against
the certificate holders* There are no meetings of certificate holders,
but they may, by written instrument, increase the nmber of trustees,
romove a trustee, appoint a new trustee if th^re be none remaining, modi-
fy the declaration of trust in any particular, terminate the trust, or
give the trustees any instructions thereunder.
The Haymarket Trust is strictly a business enterprise. The trustees
have general and exclusive powers of management, but no power to bind the
certificate holders personally. At any annual or special meeting of the
certificate holders, they may fill any vacancies in the number of trustees,
depose any or all the trustees and elect others in their place, authorize
the sale of the property or any part thereof, and alter or amend the a^;ree-
ment of trust.
The Crocker, Burbank f.^. Coo^>any is also a business enterprise. It was
formerly entitled the wachusett Realty Trust. The trust instrument v/as
before the court in Crocker v, Malley, 249 U. S. 223. The title to ali the
present trust property and the right to conduct all the business wore vested
exclusively in the trustees.
The court concluded that these three trusts were associations. The
word "association" appears to be used in its ordinary meaning. It has been
defined as a term used throughout the united States to signify a body of
perscais united without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used Ijy
incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise.
This court believes that the word "association," as used in the aot,
clearly includes "Massachusetts trusts" such as those herein involved,
having quasi corporate organizations under which they are engaged in
carrying on business enterprises.

Heoht T* llalley, 265 U. S. 144 (oontinued)
The trustees of Heoht and Haymarket Trusts rely upon the decisions in
Crookor v. Malley, 249 U, S, 223, as conclusively determining that they
cannot held to be associations unless the trust agreement vests the
shareholders with such control over the trustees as to constitute them more
than strict trusts within the Massachusetts rule*
It results from a review of the case that Crocker v, Malley, 249 U, S*
223, is not an authority for the broad proposition that, under an act
imposing an excise tax upon the privilege of carrying on a business, a
Hassaohusetts trust engaged in the carrying on of business in a quasi
corporate form, in v/hioh the trustees have similar or greater powers than
the directors in a corporation, is not an association vdthin the meaning of
its privisions. The court does not believe that it was intended that such
organizations of this character, described as associations by the Massachusetts
statutes, and sub^ject to duties and liabilities as such, should be exen^t
from the excise tax on the privilege of carrying on their business merely
because such a sligjtit measure of control may be vested in the beneficiaries
that they might be deemed strict trusts v/ithin the rule established by the
Massachusetts courts.
N. B. Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis took no part in the
decision of these cases.

Horgan v. Morgan & Others* 233 Mass. 381 (1919)
Aotlon was brought on twelve promissory notes signed and indorsed*
"The Buena Vista fruit Co., Frank E. Morris, Aoting Treasurer." In
Frost V. Thompson* 219 Mass. 360* The Buena Vista Fruit Company was
1
decided to be a partnership and not a trust. The organizers
volxmtarily adopted the partnership form of assooiation* and their
rights and obligations as shareholders are those defined by the estab-
lished rules of law applicable to ordinary partnerships.
The company was bound by acts of the acting treasurer* who was
given expTBBs authority under the declaration of trust* and by reason
of his course of conduct carried on with the knowledge and Implied
assent of those managing the business of the compai^* who held him
out to the public as having authority to sign and indorse notes in behalf
of the company*
Conclusloni The Buena Vista Fruit Coapany was brought into court
on several charges* in several different suits. In Frost v. Thompson*
219 Mass. 560* the legal status of the association was pronounced by
the court* and this point was never discussed again. In each of the
succeeding cases* it was reiterated that the association was a
partnership* reference being made to 219 Mass. 360. At no time did
the court again refer to the provisions in the declaration of trust.

Hornblower v, white, 21 F. (2d) 62 (1927)
suit was brought to recover a tax paid \mder protest.
The Costilla Estate Development Oon^any was organised to develop, by
means of irrigation, a large traot of land in Coloreulo and New Hexioo.
The declaration of trust set forth that three trustees T/ere to hold
the property for the purpose of reducing it to oash for division among its
owners ydthin the term of twenty years at longest. Vaoanoios in the office
of trustee wag to be filled by the remaining trustees. The provisions of
the trust might be modified by the trustees if assented to by a majority
of the oertifioate holders.
The Costilla Trust was not a voluntary assooiation under the laws of
Massachusetts but an express trust. Bouchard v. First people's Trust, 253
Mass. 351. Its organization was similar to that of the Waohusetts Real
Estate Trust involved in the oase of cro oker v. Malley, 249 u. S. 223,
which seems decisive of the oase at bar.
It was contended for the government that under the later oase of
Haoht V. Malley, 265 u, s, 144, the tax oould be sustained. The Hecht
Case did not over-rule the Crocker Case, but held that the three Mass.
trusts which were there concerned were associations within the definition
of the taxing acts. In each of them however, the beneficiaries had the
•uprsdse control, as they could remove the trustees. The only power which
the beneficiaries in the present case had was to assent to a modification
of the declaration of trust, suggested by the trustees.
Since the Costilla Trust was an express trust and not an assooiation,
and since it was the opinion of the court that the Crocker Caso had not
been over-ruled, the present tax is unlawful.

Husiey v. Arnold, 186 Mas 3. 202 (IS 04)
The defendants entered into an agreement establishing an aasoolation
called "The Boston Associates," and appointed thr«« trusteog to conduct the
business of the association; \rtiich was to be the investn^nt, management and
use of property in real estate.
The trust agrooment had certain provisions » The object was to obtain
for the associates most of the advantages belonging to corporations, without
the authority of any legislative act, and with freedom from the restrictions
and regulations imposed by law upon corporations.
Article XII of the trust agreement read: All contracts and engagements
enterod into by the trustees shall bo in their names as trustees, and shall
provide against any personal liability on the part of the trustees, and
stipulate that no other propertj' shall be answerable than the property in
the hands of the trustees
•
The trustees held the legal title to all the property and they alone
could make contracts. Ordinarily trustees bind themselves personedly by
their contracts with third persons. Aotlons at law upon such contracts
must be brought against them, and judgments run against them personally.
This is because the relations of the cestuis que trust to their contracts
are only equitable, and do not subject them to proceedings in a court of
common law, and the property held in trust is charged with equities which
hold it aloof from the Jurisdiction of & court of law to take it and apply
It in payment of debts created by the trustees. Such debts, if proper
charges upon the trust estate, can be paid from it under the authority of a
court of equity.
The trustees under the trust agreement v«re not authorized to contract
any debt which should charge the certificate holders* If the trustees con-
tracted in the usual way, without referring to anything which vfould limit
the liability resulting from an ordinary contract, they are personally
liable to these petitioners, end Judgment can be obtained end enforced

Eussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass* 202 (continued)
against them individually; but the trust property cannot bo held und'jr an
attaohntent nor sold upon an execution for their personal debts. If the
trustees were also certificate holders having equitable interests in the
property, these are not attachable in an action at law. They are reached
only through proceedings in equity.
Therefore the petitioners acquired no lien upon tho real estate by
their attempted attachment in an action at law*

Hoadley v. County Codomlssioners of Essex, 105 Mass. 519 (1670)
Hoadley, an Inhabitant of Lawrenoe, filed with the assessors a sworn
list of his estate liable to taxation, including therein shares in the
MoKay Sewing Maohine Assooiation* but olalming in reference to thorn that
he was not licble to be taxed* The assessors levied a tax on these shares*
which Hoadloy paid imder protest, Hoadley applied to the assessors for an
abatement, which application they dismissed* Thereupon he made application
to the County Commissioners*
Those shares had been issued by the T<<oKay Sevring Maohine Association,
an organization known as a trust* One Gordon McKay executed the declara-
tion of trust by which he declared that he held his patents for sewing
the soles of boots and shoes to the vamps» his factory where machines
we^e manufactured under these patents and the whole business theretofore
carried on by him, in trust for such persons as should buy certificates
which were to be issued under that declaration of trust to the amount of
fifty thousand in niuaber, the proc eds to be used in carrying on the
factory and business assigned to and held by the trustee.
Article IV of the declaration readi The general management of the
business in the future shall be v sted in an executive coranittee of not
less than throe nor more than five shareholders, to be ohosen by the
nrfiole body of sharoholders at a meeting called by the trustee for the
purpose, and to serve till others should be chosen in their steadi and
that a majority of the conranittee should constitute a quorum, and decide
in all matters ov r which tha committee had control*
Article VIII: In the event of the d^^ath, resignation, or disability
of MoKay, a new trustee shall be chosen by the shareholders.
Judge Morton heldx This is a voluntary associ tion of individuals,
and its articles of agreement, although they adopt some of the forms of
managing the business usual in corporations, constitute a copartnership.

Hoadley v. County Commiaslonors of Esoex, 105 Mass* 519 (oontlnued)
It cannot sue and b« sued as a corporation; its members are individitally
liable for its debts; and it has none of the special attributes which
belong to a corporation duly organleed und<<r our laws*
Being a copartnership, the laws applicable to that relation must
govern its rights and liabilitiesj and it follows that the personal
property held by it was properly taxed in Boston where its business is
carried on, and not in Lawrence. Therefor© the tax assessed by the city
of Lawrence upon Hoadley is illegal.
Conclusionj Article IV of the declaration of trust states that the
management of the business was in the control of the shareholders.
Article VIII gave the shareholders po .er to elect a new truste>e# These
two provisions made this organization a copartnership, notv/ithstanding
provisions in the trust deed to the contrary. The chief distinction
between a business trust and a partnorship is that the shareholdoro as
beneficiaries cannot control the management of the business, end if the
power to manage the business is vested in the shar? holders or if they
are permitted to appoint and remove trustees at will« the courts treat
the organization as a partnership.

Howe V, Chmlellnskl & Others, 237 Mass 532
The plaintiff and his associate shareholders under the terms of an
agreement In writing created a building trust with transferable shares. It
was provided that the trustees should hold the legal title to the trust
property, and that vaoanoies in their ntoaber should be filled by three
-
fourths in vulu of the shart^holders, who also were empowered to depose
and elect other trustees in their place, and to change, alter or
terminate the trust and direct the salo of the trust property. Thh proceeds
of such sale were to be distributed among the shareholders in proportion to
their respective interests in the trust, end upon such termination the
trustees were to be discharged from further liability.
Zt is contended that, while tho plaintiff and his associate share-
holders under the above stated provisions of the trust agreement may have
been partners as to third persons, they did not as between themselves
sustedn this relation, and that in the transactions relating to the sale
of the property as disclosed by the record, the Plaintiff was free to
enrich himself at their expense. The court quoted from Williams v.
Milton, 215 Mass. It Where persons associated themselves together to
carry on business for their mutual profit, they are none tho less
partners because their shares in the partnership are represented by
certificates which are transferable end transmittable, and because as
a matter of convenience (if not of necessity in case of transferable and
transmittable certifioates) the legal title to the partnership property
is taken in the name of a third person. The person in irtiose name the
partnership property stands in such a case is perhaps in a sense a trustee.
But speaking with accuracy he is an agent who for the principal's convenience
holds tho legal title to the principal's property.
Since the trustees were managing agents subject to the control of the
shareholders, the Judge ruled that instead of a pure trust a partnership
existed for the purpose of carrying on business for their mutual benefit »
clLthough the legal title to the property stood in the name of the trustees.

Eliot V. Freeman, 220 U, S, 178 (1911)
The question is raised as to the right to lay a tax upon a certain
trust formed for the purpose of purchasing, improving, holding and selling
lands and buildings in Boston, known as The Gushing Real Estate Trust.
The trustees had the management of the proierty with absolute control
and authority over the same* The shareholders are to be paid dividends
from the net income of the property, and twenty years after the tennina-
tion of lives in being, the property is to bo sold and proceeds divided
among the cestui s*
Undor the Massachusetts law the respondents are merely trustees.
Mayo V. Moritz, 151 Mass. 481j Howe v. v'orse, 174 Mass. 491, The trust
is not an association organized under the laws of any state or country.
Statutory joint-stock compeuiies are not known in Massachusetts. No
tax is laid upon these trusts, common law trusts, except the ordinary tax
upon the property. This pro erty is taxed to the trustees like the
property of any other trust. The beneficiaries have a purely equitable
interest in the property and no tax is laid upon their inter >st. . ussey
V. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202.
The court said in this opinion: Wo are of the opinion that Congress
intended to embrace within this tax only such corporations and joint-
stock associations as are organized \jndor some statute, or derive from
that source some quality or benefit, not existing at the coanmon law.
Therefore, since The Gushing Real Estate Trust is a pure trust,
known as a Massachusetts trust, it is not within the terms of this act.

Flint V. Codman, 247 Mass. 463 (1924)
Suit in equity brought by the minority ahareholdors in Lovejoy 'a
Wharf Trust seeking to enjoin a sale of the corpus of the trust by the
trustees* who are the individual defendants*
Article X of the trust deed roads: The trustees may call meetings of
the shareholders at any time, and shall do so upon vnritten request of the
holders of one-twentieth of the shares outstanding. At any meeting, the
holders of a majority of the entire number of shares may fill any vacancy
existing in the number of trustees, may depose any or all of the trustees,
and elect others in their places, may authorise the sale or mortgage of
the property, or any part thereof, held by the said trustees, and may edter
or amend this agreement or terminate the trusts hereunder. For all other
purposes a majority of those shareholders present may decide on matters
properly coming before them* Shareholders may vote by proxy, and for the
purpose of voting at meetings each share shall be entitled to one vote.
At any meeting five shareholders, or their proxies, representing one-
fifth of all the shares outstanding, shall constitute a quorum.
It Is manifest from these words that the shareholders have the
ultimate control of all affairs of the trust. Since the trustees may
be removed at any meeting of the shareholders; or the frame of the
declaration of trust be altered; or the entire transaction terminated,
and its affairs liquidated; the trustees are subject to the shareholders.
This type of arrangement constitutes a partnership among the share-
holders, and any suit brought by shareholders will be settled upon the
principles governing partnerships In this Canmonwealth.

Gleason v. MoRay, 134 Mass. 419 (1633)
This suit was brought by the treasurer of the Comnionwealth against
the trustee of the McRay Sewing Machine Association to recover a tax
assessed upon the association* This tax was an excise upon some
franchises or privileges sought to be held "by the copartnership or
association in supposed analogy to the franchises of corpor&^lon8•
Ur. Chief Justice Morton heldt The defendant in this case is not
a corporation* It is merely a partnership, with all the Incidents and
responsibilities of a partnership. It enjoys no franchises conl'erred
upon it by the legislature. It does not ask for or enjoy any corporate
or special privilegos. It has constituted its p»rtnershlp under its
common law rights and such legeJL agreemonts as it chooses to make* The
peculiar feature, that the interest of each member muy be transferred
without the special assent of tho other menbors, is cx'oatsd by agreement
of the partners xmdar their natural rights ixz coirmon law.
The tar. v/as held to be unconstitutional, since the organization
was declared to b' a partnership, end not t corporation.
Conclusion: Tho court held this organization tc be a piiTtnarship,
without discussing tho reasons for this contention. This association
came b-fora the ccurt in Koadley v. County Cofflndssioncrs of hssex, 105
Mass. 519, T«4iere the test for determining ths legal status of an
organization was applied. Followed in Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1

Mayo V. Morltz, 151 Maas. 481 (1890)
Bill in equity, filod in the superior Court against Josoph Morltz,
John FwidHl, Williem Fernekees end Charles Loober, tructeea of tho Loeber
Pneumatic Rnfine Company. Plaintiff asaipned to thoso trustees his invention
and his applioetions for lettors patent therefor, to manage and dispose of
the seme in his discretion, end to divide the net aTails bet^Ae^n the inventor
and tho holders of scrip to be issued. The trustees accepted tho trust, and
issued scrip to themselves and to others, and contracted a debt for the
purpose of the trust.
Judge Allen held: The deod of trust does not have thf? efffict to make
the sorip-holders partners. It does not contemplete the carrying on of a
partnership business upon the joint account of the .^^rantor and the scrip-
hold rs, and in this respect the case is imlik, Gleason v. McKay, 154 Mass.
419 and Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510. The sorip-holders are
oestuis quo trust, and are entitled to their share of the avails of the
property when the same is sold*
If the trustees contracted a debt to tho plaintiff, they are liable
for it personally, and an action at law may bo maintained by him against
thorn. In tho present case, the Plaintiff seeks to have the whole trust
property sold, and the proceeds apulied to the payment of his single debt.
But the Invention is held in trust and ia trust property.
Therefore tho plaintiff should ask for an amendmont ohan(:ing his
proceeding into tin action at law, xf he ir? so advired, in the Superior
Court.

Heal V. united states, 26 F. (2d) 708 (1928)
This la a petitioa to reoonrer capital stock paid uzider protest by the
petitionerSf who are trustees of the First people* s Trust* uader a written
declaration of trusb* dated October 28* 1919.
The provisions of the trust aEreement confer upon the shareholders no
rights or powers other than to receive their proportionate share of the
income, and of the assets in the event of liquidation* They hcve no power,
individually or collectively, to elect or remove trustees, or to terminate
or modify the trust. In this trust the benef . claries have not oven the
power to assent to amendments* The shareholders have never held any meetings,
or attempted, jointly or individually, to exercise any control whatever over
the action of the trustees or over the affairs of the truet.
This trust came before the Supremo Judicial Court of the commonwealth
of Massachusetts in the cose of Bouchard v* First People^ a Trust, 253 Mass*
351, and it was there held that the truflt was not a voluntary association*
Thfc court was of the opinion that the declaration of trust created an
express trust, and not an association*
District Judge Erev;ster held in thia casei Hot only in the interest
of uniformity, but in the belief that the distinction dravm bet^veen
associations and express trusts ia sound in principle, I em prepared to
concur in the views expressed in Hornblower v* white, 21 F, (2d) 82, and in
Bouchard v* First People* s Trust, 253 Mass* 351, The government contends
that the elaasifioation must be determined with reference to the purposes
of the trust, or the nature and extent of the activities of the trustee*
carried on in pursuance of those purposes*
neither Hecht v* Malley, 265 U* S. 144 or Burk-Waggoner Association
v* Hopkins, 269 U* 3* 110, support this contention* In the latter case,
Mr* justice Brandeis points out that the Burk-Waggoner Aaaoolation is
an vmincorporated Joint-stock association, like those described in Hecht v*
Malley, supra, and these trusts were distinguished by Judge Lowell from the
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the trust before the oourt in the case of Hornblower t* white, supra.
They are even more distinguishable from the trust in the oase at bar.

Phillips V. Blatohford, 137 Mass, 510 (1884)
Bill in equity was filed against the surviving executor of the vdll
of MarshRll S. Houdder for oontrlbiition.
Certain porsona entered into a copartnership styled The Ryder
Reciprocal Grate Association, und r a declaration of trust, by the terms
of which no member, as such, was to have control ovor the business of the
association, vrtiich was to be entirely under the control of a board of
managers, of whom the trustee was to be a member, and the other members
were to bo elected by the shareholders*
The folloiving provision was insarted in the decliirationj The
decease of a member of the aesoisie.tion shall not vrork a dissolution of
it, nor shall it entitle his legal ropresuntatives to sn account, or to
te-ka any action in the courts or othervd-so, against tha aasoci ition or
the truster?, for such; but they shall simply succrjed to th^ right of
the deceased to ths certificate and the shares it represents, subj-^ot to
this dealaration of truflt.
Judge Oliver Wandell nolmes held: It is too lato to contend that
partnerships with trasisferuble shares are illcgiil in this Ccaamonwoalth.
They have been rooogniRed fts lawful bj' the court from Alvord v» Smith,
5 pick. 232, to Gloftson v. McKay, 134 Mass, 419.
If a partnershii' incurs debts, the members are personally liable,
and there is no need of a paid-up capital. A man may contract with his
oopartn«?r8 to indenmlfy then for e. certain proportion of liabllioies
incurred after his deathj and, if such liabilities are incurred, his
er.ecutor v,dll be botmd do bonis testatoris in the same way that he is
by any other contract of his executor, end vdthout introducing any
anomalous principle TihRtevfT, urdinarily when a partner contracts that
his share in the profits shall continue to a certain time, he oontracte
by implication that his liability for losses shall have the same

Phillips V. BlRtcihford, 137 Mfvas* 610 (oontlnuod)
duration, w« see no reason why this prlnoiplo should not apply when th«
tine extends beyond the partner's life. And vhen, as hero, a oorapaay is
purpos'^ly made as nearly a corporation as possible, and it is obviously
Intended that the death of a shareholder shall not affeot either the
company or the rlf^ts incident to the share, we think that tho
liabilities go vdth the rl?;hts» ond that tiio effect of the testator's
contract wns that he 'vonld share losses until his estate ^as rolievod of
his shares in the stock.
Conclusion: Judge Holmes did not dlscviss tho lo(^al status of thl?;
assoc5ation» He stated that such an orjjflJiitation -."ras a pfirtnorship,
made as nearly a corporation as possible} and added an irtiportfi.nt
princiule of Ian, that in these partnerships with transfor^abla '?haro3
liabilities ."^o w^th tho rights* and that death does not affect theoe
rights or liBbilities.

state V. Lafforty, Harrison Common pleas Court Ohio
No Just government evor did, nor probably ever can, exist without an
unwritten or common law. By the oonimon law. Is meant those maxims, prin-
oinlos, and forms of Judicial proceadines, which have no written law to
prescribe or warrant them, but which, founded on the laws of nature and the
dictates of reason, have by usage and custom, become interwoven with the
written lews; and by such incorporation, form a part of the municipal code
of each state or Nation, which has emerged from the loose and erratic habits
of savage life, to civilization, order and a government of lew.
As the laws of nature and reason are necessarily in force in every
community of civilized men (because nature Is the common parent, and reason
the common {^ardian of man), so with communities as with individuals, the
ripht of self-preservation is a right, paramount to the institution of
written law; and hence the maxim, the safety of the people is the supreme
law, needs not the sanction of a constitution or statute to give it validity
and force, hut it can not have validity and force, as law, unless the
judicial tribunals have power to punish all such actions as directly tend to
Jeopardize that safety. The common law of England has always been the com-
mon law of the colonies end state of North America because yfhen North
AnerioR was colonized by emigrants v.-ho fled from the pressure of monarohs
and priestcraft in the old world to en^oy freedom in the new, they brought
with them the common law of England (thoir mother country'), cle.im3.ng it as
their birthright and inheritance, Frcia thence, through every st&ge of the
colonial governments, the cOTimon law was in force, so far as it was found
necessary or useful.
It maj' be concluded, that were the written laws wholly silent on a
subject, the principles and maxims of the common law must, of necessity,
by the rule and guide of Judicial decision, to supply the defects of a
necessp.rily Jjnperfect legislation; and to prevent "the will of the Judge,
that law of tryants," being substituted in theiroom of known and settled
rules of law in the adirdnistration of Justice.

state V. Lafferty, Harrison Common pleas Court Ohio (continued)
A statute whloh is clearly repugnant to the oommon law must be held
at repealing it, for the last expression of the legislative will must
prorall. ^vhen a new statute covers the whole pround occupied by a
previous one, or by the common law, it repeals* by implication, the
prior law.
* Copied verbatim from the o; inlon of the court In this case.

Williams & OthorSf Trustees, v. Inhabitants of Milton, 21b Mass. 1 (1914)
Four petitions for the abatement of tcLxes assessed upon the Plaintiff
as trustees of the Boston Personal Property Trust. The Boston taxes were
assessed on the theory that the property held by the plaintiff under that
trust was partnership property. The right to tax property as trust or as
partnership property depends upon urtiat the character of the property taxed
really is* The prinoiplos on which this question of tho true oharaotor of
the Boston i'ersonal Trust dep nds are:
(1) Where persons associate themselves together to carry on business
for their mutual profit, thoy are none the less partners because their
shares are represented by certificates which are transferrable and trans-
missible*
(2) As a matter of convenience the legal title to the partnership
property is taken in the name of a third person.
Several such instances of partnerships in our reports are: Hoadley
V. County Commissioners, 106 Mass. 519i Gleason v. McKay* 134 Mass. 419;
Whitman v. Porter, 107 Mass. 622j Philips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510j
Ricker V. American Loan k Trust Co., 140 Mass. 346j vVilliams v. Boston,
208 Mass. 197.
(3) By the terms of this indenture th:i property contributed by the
cestuis que trustent was to be held by the trustees in trust to pay the
income to the holders of the certificates, and upon the termination of
the trust to divide the trust fund among them.
(4) The cestuis que trustent are in no way associated together, nor
is there any provision in the Indenture of trust for any meeting to be
hold by them. They may consent to an alteration or amendment of the trust
or to a termination of it before the time fixed in the deed. They cannot
force the trustees to make such alteration, amendment, or termination.
(5) Gains made by purchases and sales are profits of a partnership,
divisible as such among those entitled to tho profits of the partnership.

Vfilliaxas y« Mlltozif 21b Mass. 1 (coxxtinuad)
Gains made by a ohanp.e of invostments in a trust are an aocrotion belonging
to the corpus of the trust fund* end belong to those who own the corpus of
the fund.
(6) Therefore, sinoe the property is the property of the trustees, to
be managed by the trustees and not the oestuis« there is no asaooiation of
or among the oestuis* The rights of the oestuis are limited to each
receiving his share of the income of the trust investments during the con-
tinuance of the trust and his share of the corpus of the trust when the
trust comes to an en4*
This organization is in ev^ry respect an investment trust and not a
partnership. Therefore, it follows that the property held by the Plaintiff,
618 trustee, was not taxable as partnership property.
Conclusion: The principles stated in this case reiterate those
enunciated by Judge Morton in Hoadley v. County Comraiasionera of Essex,
105 Mass. 519, in 1870* There it was found that the as5JOoiation was a
copartnership, despite the assertions in the declf.ration of trust to the
contrary, in ull these M^issachustjtts oases, the indention of the
organisers is not the detoriuininc factor; the anounb of control exercised
by the shareholders is more important in detGnoinlng the legal status of
the organisation*

Willis V. commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 F. (2d) 121 (1932)
petitioners are trustees under an instnxment of trust Miloh declared
the purposes of the trust to be acquisition, management, improvement, and
disposition of trust property, and all oth^r property acquired for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustees were given these broad po//ersi
to fill vacancies caused by the retirement of any trustee j to borrow
money; to use capital or income in the improvement of the property, or in
the acquisition of other property.
The collection of the income tax from this trust is justified by the
commissioner under the claim that the trust organisation, in form and in
its practice is an "association" as that term is understood where used in
the Revenue Aot of 1924,
Simply stated, the question is, did the trustees manage and operate
the property in their charge as a business, with the purpose to accumulate
a profit by the use of it, or was their sole purpose, intended and pursued,
to dispose of it as rapidly as possible and divide the proceeds among the
beneficiaries? As a liquidating trust purely, the income would not be
taxablej as a business venture, the income v/ould be taxable. The distinc-
tion is made clear in Hecht v, Malley, 265 U, S. 144.
The question is to be determined from the facts showing what the
trustees did in handling the property. The terms of the trust instrument
are not conclusive, but they indicate the prupose in the minds of the
beneficiaries, and are of significance when it is observed the the trustees
assumed much of the pov/er conferred upon them. Judged by their course of
action as shown, it vfould be reasonable to assume that the trustees would
continue to deal with the property in like manner as long as the trust
remained alive. Such acts, as enumerated, gave to the trust operations the
character of an active business enterprise. Therefore, the income would be
taxable.

The Boston Personal Property Trust, Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1
This Declaration of Trust, made this tenth day of January, in the year
eighteen hundred and ninety-three, by John Quinoy Adams of Quinoy, Hoses
Williams of Brookline, William Minot, Jr. and Abbot Lawrenoe Lowell both
of Boston, and Robert Sedgvrlok Minot of Manchester, all in the Coinmon-
wealth of Massachusetts (hereinafter called the Trustees,) witnesseth
Designation
First. That this trust shall be designated the "Boston Personal
Property Trust."
1. TRUSTEES' DUTIES, POWKRS AND LIABILITIES
Declaration, not a Partnership, Cestuls not Liable
Second. That the said Trustees shall hold all the funds and property
(hereinafter called the trust fund), now or hereafter held by or paid to,
or transferred or conveyed to them or their successors as Trustees here-
imder in trust for the purposes, with the powers and subject to the
limitations hereinafter declared, for the benefit of the cestuls que trust-
ent, and it is hereby expressly declared that a trust, and not a partner-
ship, is hereby created; that neither the trustees nor the cestuls que
trustent shall ever be ' ersonally liable hereunder as partners or other-
wise, but that for all debts the trustees shall be liable as such to the
extent of the trist fund only. In all contracts or Instruments creating
liability, it shall be expressly stipulated that the cestuls que trustent
hall not be liable*
PAXMENTS.
Third. In case any person proposes to pay by instalments, or at a
future date, suns of money for interests in the trust fund, the trustees
shall have full power and discretion to call such payments upon such terms
and conditions as they see fit, and to receive the same either wholly or
partly in cash, or in any property in which they are authorized to invest
said fund.

POWER OF INYESTMENTf PERSONAL PROFERTT» GROUND RENTS
Fourth, (a) The Trustees shall have as full power and disoretion, as
If absolute owners* to invest and reinvest the trust fund (including any
surplus and alto income) in personal property* including bonds and notes or
obligations secured upon real estate, and the decision of the Trustees as
to what is personal property shall bo final. They shall have the like
power of investment in the purchase and improvement of real estate in the
cities of the United States of America for the purposes of leasing the
same upon long terms, or ground rents so called} and all real estate so
purchased shall be conveyed to them in Joint tenancy as Trustees hereunder*
POWER OF SALE
(b) The Trustees shall have full power and discretion to
sell, transfer* and convey from time to time, at public or private sale
any part or all of said trust fund, upon such terms and conditions as
they see fit, and to invest the proceeds in the same manner* and upon
the same terms as the original fund*
POWERS AS TO REAL ESTATE
(e) The Trustees shall have absolute control over and
power to dispose of all real estate held by them at azQr time imder this
Trust, as if they were the absolute owners thereof, including the power
to sell and convey, as above set forth, to improve, to lease or hire for
improvement or otherwise, for a term beyond the possible termination of
this trust, or for any less term, either with or without option of pur-
chase, to let, to exchange, to release, and to partition*
POWER TO BORROW AND PLEDGE
(d) The Trustees may borrow money, for such time and
upon such terms as they see fit, on mortgage of any real estate held by
them hereunder, and may give mortgages therefor, either with or without
power of sale, but never for more than sixty per cent, of the value in
their Judgment of the property mortgaged*

EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENTS
(f) The exeoutlon of all oontraots, of all oonveyanoes and transfers,
and of all other instruments relating to the trust fund or any part thereof,
by any three Trustees, shall always be sufficient. The acting Trustee or
Actuary or Treasurer shall have full power to cancel and discharge mortgages
by deed or otherwise, on the payment of satisfaction thereof.
PURCHASER, ETC., NOT LIABLE
(g) Ho purchaser, lender, corporation, association or officer or
transfer agent thereof, dealing with the Trustees, shall be bound to make
any inquiry concerning the validity of ejoy sale* pledge, mortgage, loan* or
purchase purporting to be made by the Trustees, or be liable for the
iqppllcation of money paid or loaned.
RECORDS, DEPOSITARY
Fifth. The Trustees shedl constitute as their depositary such trust
company in the city of Boston as they shall from time to time select, and
hereby declare that they have selected for such Depositary the State Street
Safe Doposit ft Trust Company. Such Depositary shall have the custody of
this declaration of trust, of any and all instruments altering or adding to
the saiae, or terminating the trust, or containing the resignation of one or
more Trustees, or appointing one or more Trustees to fill vacancies, or
appointing a Trustee attorney for a co-trustee, or otherwise affecting
affecting this declaration of trust, or the duties, powers, or liabilities
of the Trustees. Such Depositary shall be bound to deliver on demand to any
new Depositaiy selected by the Trustees, all such documents and records, and
also to record, at the request of the trustees, any such document in any
place of public record selected by them, whereupon the duty of such
Depositary as to such recorded dooxment, and its liability therefor here-
under shall cease, and it shall deliver to the Trustees all papers relating
to the same. Copies of all doc\aments and records In the custody of such
Depositary, and certificates as to who are the Trustees, or oestuls que
trustent, or the like, duly signed by the President, Treasurer, or

Aotuary of suoh Depositary, shall bd conoluslTe upon all questions as to
title or affeotlng the rights of third persons* and in general shall hare
all the effeot of their originals*
IIANABEUENT MD COMPENSATION
sixth* The trusto&s may from time to time hire suitable offioes for
the transaction of the business of the Trust, appoint, remove, or re-
appoint suoh officers or agents (including a Depositary, and also agents to
procure proposals for payments for interests herein) as they may think best
define their duties, and fix their oonpensatlon* The oompensatlon of the
Trustees shall not at exsy time exceed five per cent* of the gross inoome
of the Trust Fund, and one per oeut* of the amount distributed or con-
veyed upon final distribution or conveyance
•
DIVIDl'NDS, SURPLUS
Seventh, The Trustees shall declare dividends from the net income of
the Trust Fund among the oestuis que trustent quarterly, or oftener, if
convenient to the Trustees, and their decision as to the amount of dividend
and as to using therefor any portion of the surplus fund, shall be final*
They may set aside from time to time suoh portion of the net inoome as
shall not be required for dividends for a surplus fund.
POWER TO DECIDE BETWEEN INCOME AMD CAPITAL
Eighth* The Trustees may charge all brokers* and agents' commissions
to Income or Capited, as they see fit* They shall have the right to treat
as inoome suoh portion of the price of stock bought or sold between div-
idend days as fairly represents accrued dividends reckoned by way of in-
terest, but nev^r at a higher rate than six per cent* per annum on the
price paid or rec ived* In general their decision as to what constitutes
Capital or Income, or shall be credited or debited to Capital or Inoomoc
shall be final.
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ANNUAL ACCOUNT
Hinth. The Trustees shall render an account annually or oftener, if
convenient to them, and shall* upon request, deliver or mail a copy to each
cestui que trust*
RBSIONATION, VACANCY, NEW AP' OINTM- NT, TEBIPORARY
ABSENCE, POvVER OF ATTORNEY
Tenth* Any Trustee may resign his trust by a written instrument
signed eoid sealed by him, and acknowledged in the manner prescribed for the
acknowlodgmont of deeds, and such instrxanent may be recorded in the
Registry of Deeds for the County of Suffolk, or deposited with such
Depositary as the Trustees shall from time to time select*
Any vacancy occurring from any cause at any time in the
number of said Trustees shall be filled by the remaining Trustees* until
such vacancy is filled, or while ar^^ Trustee is absent from the Cosomon-
wealth of MMsachusetts* or physioedly or mentally incapable, by reason of
disease or otherwise, the other Trustees shall havo all the powers here-
under, and the certificate of the other Trustees of such vaoeiicy, absence
or incapacity shall be conclusive* In case of such vacancy or if appoint-
ment of a new Trustee or Trustees, the Trust Fund shall ijsmediately vest
in the remaining Trustees or in the new Trustee or Trustees, ;<ointly with
the remaining Trustees, as the case may be* Ajxy Trustee may, by power of
attorney delegate his powers, for a period not exceeding six months at
ai^ one time, to any other Trustee or Trustees hereimder, provided that in
no oase shall less than three Trustees personally exercise the other
powers hereunder (except in case of dischtvrge of mortgages, as hereinbe-
fore provided).
The term "Trusteoa" used in this agreement shall be deemed to
mean those who are or nay be Trustees for the time being.
TRUSTEES* LIABILITY, NO BOND REQUIRED
Eleventh, Each Trustee shall be responsible only for his own willful
and corrupt breach of trust, and not for any honest error of ;Judgment, and
not for one another* Ho Trustee shull be required to give a bond*
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2, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIi^S OF CESTUIS QUE TRUSTENT
NOTICES
Twelfth. Notices delivered personally, or mailed with prepayment of
postage seven days beforehand to any cestui que trust, or to his attorney
duly designated for the purpose, at the residence stated by him or in the
certificate, or to the address given by him or them from time to time to
the Trustees, shall be binding*
FORFEITURE OF PAYMENTS
Thirteenth. In case any cestui que trust neglects to pay any in-
stalment within the time specified in the csuLl therefor, the Trustees
may, if they see fit, declare any amoiant of his previous payment or pay-
ments to be forfeited.
CERTIFICATES, COIfVERTIBLE SCRIPT, LOST CERTIFICATES
Fourteenth. The Trustees shall issue a certificate, in such form as
they shall deem best* to each person who shall pay the sum of one thousand
dollars or multiple thereof, for an interest in the Trust Fund. But no
certificate shall be issued for any less sum than one thousand dollars,
at par value. The Trustees may also from time to time, if they see fit.
Issue scrip of the par value of one hundred dollars or multiples thereof,
convertible into certificates in sums of one thousand dollars or multiples
thereof, and bearing interest, and on such other terms and conditions as
they shall deem best.
In case of the loss or destruction of a certificate or
script, the Trustees may issue a duplicate thereof, on such terms as they
deem proper.
TRANSFER OF CERTIFICATES
Fifteenth. The interests represented by the certificates may be
transferred on the books of the Trustees by the cerson named therein, or
his legal representative, upon the surrender of the certificate, and a new
certificate shall be issued to the transferee, who shall thereupon become

a cestui que trust. But no such interest shall be sold vtntll the holder
thereof (including assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy, or for benefit
of creditors eund holdersby process of law or otherwise, except es harein-
efter stated) shall have first in writing offered it for sale to the
Trustees, who shall, as such Trustees, have the option for ten days after
the receipt of such off !r of buying the same at not more than the last
preceding appraisal made by them, such e^praisal to bt^ made annually or
oftener as they shall doem beat. Interests so purchased by the Trustees
may be held as part of the Trust Fund, or sold by them at their discretion*
Devises by will, distribution of the assets of deceased persons
according to law, and distribution of trust funds among those entitled there-
to, upon the termination of the trust, shedl not be deemed sales for the
purposes hereof.
NO ASSEfiS?/ENT OR PERSONAL LIABILITT
sixteenth. No assessment shall ever be made u on the oestuis que
trustent, nor shall they ever be personally liable in ai^r event, or hove
any rights hereundor except as herein defined.
BOOKS OPEN TO INSPECTION
Seventeenth. The books of the Trustees shall always be open to the
inspection of the cestui s que trustent.
INCREASE OF CAPITjLL, IGHTS
Eighteenth. The Trustees may from tine to time, at thoir discretion,
invite and receive payments for interests in the Trust Fund in cash or in
property, as hereinbefore provided, for the purpose of increesing the
capital of the Trust Fund, giving preference, if they see fit, upon such
terms and conditions as they shall df?em best, to existing cestuis que
trustent. All payments shall be subject to the terms of this Deolaretion
of Trust.

3. DURATION AMD TKRHINATION OF TRUST
Kineteenth. At and upon the expiration of twenty years after the
death of the last survivor of the follov/ing-named persons t-
Walter Abbott, sone of John Abbott of Boston;
George C» Adams, son of John Ouinoy Adams of Quinoyj
Oliver Ames, son of Frederick L# Afies of Easton;
F. Roginald Banps, son of Edward Bangs of Wareham;
Boylston A* Beai, son of Janies H« Beal or Boston;
Robert p. Blake, son of S, Parkman Blake of Boston;
Causten Browne, Jr., son of Causten Browne of Boston;
Edmund D» Codman, son of pobert Codman of Boston;
David H. Coolidge, Jr., son of David H, Coolldge of Boston;
Philip Dexter, son of William S. Doxter of Bo:5tonj
John M, Howells, son of William Howells of Boston;
Lawenoe Minot, son of Williom Minot of Boston;
William Minot, 3rd, son of William Minot, Jr., of BosTion;
James Otis Potter, son of Alexander S. Potter of Beverly;
Abbott Lawrence potoh, son of Benjamin 3. Rotch, late of Milton;
James J. Storrow, Jr., son of James J, Storrow of Boston;
Samuel Wells, Jr., son of Samuel wells of Bojton;
George Putnem, son of 'Ailliam I.. Putnam of Boston;
Gladys Williams, daughter of Moses Williams of Brookline;
Robert S. Minot, or*, son of Robert S. Minot of Manchester;
or at such earlier time as hereinafter provided, the Trustees shall
terminate this trust by dividing the Trust Fund, or the prooeeds thereof,
among the oestuls que trustent, being first duly indemnified for any out-
standing obligation or liability, and shall thereupon be forthwith
discharged.
ALTERATION OF TRUST, TEmilNATION OF TRUST,
COKVEYANCE OP TRUST FUKD
Twentieth. The trustees may, with the consent of the three-fourths in
interest of the oeatuis que trustent, alter or add to this declaration, or
terminate this trust, and if it seems to them judicious so to do, they may
with like consent, convey the Trust Fund to new or other Trustees, or to a
corporation, being first duly indemnified for any outstanding obligations
or liabilities. The Instrument setting forth such alteration, addition,
termination, or conveyance shall be signed by at least three of the
Trustees and recorded in said Registry of Deeds, or deposited with such
Depositary as the Trusbees shall select. Such instriiments shall be con-
clusive of the existence of all facts and of cataj liance with all pre-

requisites necessary to the validity of such alteration, addition, ter-
mination, or oonTreyanoe, whethor stated in such instrument or not, upon
all questions as to title or affnoting the rights of third persons.
Provided, however, and it Is especially declared that the T2*U8tee8
hall be under no obligation to terminate this Trust or convey the Trust
Fund, except as hereinbefore provided*
IN TESTIMONIUM
'I>wenty-first* In Witness Whereof, the said Trustees have hereunto
•et their hands and seals the day and year above written In duplioate.
Signed and sealed in presence of
signed Charles H, Shriver
(seal)
(John Quinoy Adams (Seal)
Gnoses Williams (Seal)
Signed (William Minot, J\inior (Seal)
(A* Lawrence Lowell (Seal)
(Robert 3, Mii.ot (Seal)
Cominonwaalth of Massachusett;)) sst
Suffolk )
Boston, January 14, 1895.
Then persanally appeared the above named Johii Quinoy Aiiaaa, lAosec
Williams, William Minot, J\iaior, A. Lajyrence Lov/ell, Robert S. Minot,
and asknowledged the foregoing instrument to b« their free &<3t jjod dead.
Before me.
Signed Charles H. Shriver, Noi;ary Public.
A true copy of the original on fiio with shis Company.
State Street Trust Company,
A. L. Carr, Treasurer.

common Law
"The Common law of Maaaaohusetts, then, properly embraces, in the first
plaoe, that portion of the ccmanon law of England, (as modified and ameliorated
by English statutes.) which was in force at the time of the emigration of our
ancestors* and was applicable to the situation of the colony, and has since
been recognised and acted upon, during the succassiTe progresses of our
Colonial, Provincial, and State Governments, with this additional qualifica-
tion, that it has not been altered, repealed or modified by any of our own
sub/juent legislation now in force* In the next place, it embraces those
local usages and principles, which have the authority of law, but which are
not founded upon any local statutes* The latter, indeed, are so few, and
comparatively, in a general sense, so important, that they may, for all our
present purposes, be passed over without farther observation or notice*
"The next inquiry is» what is the true nature or character of the common
law, so recognized and established, and where are its doctrines and princi-
ples to be found* In relation to the former part of the inquiry, it may be
generally stated, that the common law consists of positive rules and rem-
edies, of general usages and customs, and of elementary principles, and the
developments or applications of them, which cannot be distinctly traced back
to any statutory enactments, but which rest for this authority upon the com-
mon recognition, consent and use of the state itself* Some of these rules,
usages and principles are of such high antiquity, thsl the time cannot be
assigned, when they had not an existence and use*
In truth, the common law is not in its nature and character en absolutely
fixed, inflexible system, like the statute law, providing only for cases of a
determinate form, which fall within the letter of the language, in which a
particular doctrine or legal proposition is expressed. It is rather a
system of elementary principles and of general juridical truths, which are
continually expanding with the progress of society, and adapting themselves
to the gradual changes of trade, and commerce, and the mechanic arts, and
the exigencies and usages of the country* There are certain fundamental

Oomnon Law (continued)
maxima in it, iRrtiioh aro never departed from; there are others again, which,
though true in a general sense, are at the same time ausoeptiblo of modifi-
cation and exceptions, to prevent them from doing manifest wrong and injury.
When a oase, not affected by any statute, arises in az^ of our courts of
Justice j and the facts are established, the first questioii is, whether
there is any clear and unequivocal principle of the common law, which di-
rectly and immediately governs it, and fixes the rights of the parties. If
there be no such principle, the next question is, whether there is any prin-
ciple of the common law, v/hich, by analogy, or parity or reasoning, ought to
govern it« if neither of these sources furnishes a positive solution of the
controversy, resort is next had (as in a case confessedly new) to the prin-
ciples of natural Justice which constitute the beisis of the common law; and
If these principles can be ascertained to apply in a full and determinate
manner to all the circumstances, they are adopted, and decide the rights of
the parties."
Copied verbatim from the report on the Codification of the Common Law
submitted to his Excellency The Governor, January 16, 1837. Joseph Story
was chairman of this ooomittee, and this part of the report was written
by hia. See "Miscellaneous writings" of Joseph Story, edited by his
son, William Story.
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